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Abstract
In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey of authentication protocols for Internet of Things (IoT). Specifically, we
select and in-detail examine more than forty authentication protocols developed for or applied in the context of the IoT under
four environments, including: (1) Machine to machine communications (M2M), (2) Internet of Vehicles (IoV), (3) Internet of
Energy (IoE), and (4) Internet of Sensors (IoS). We start by reviewing all survey articles published in the recent years that
focusing on different aspects of the IoT idea. Then, we review threat models, countermeasures, and formal security verification
techniques used in authentication protocols for the IoT. In addition, we provide a taxonomy and comparison of authentication
protocols for the IoT in form of tables in five terms, namely, network model, goals, main processes, computation complexity,
and communication overhead. Based on the current survey, we identify open issues and suggest hints for future research.
Keywords: Security, Authentication, Cryptographic primitives, Internet of Things, Machine to machine communications,
Internet of Vehicles, Internet of Energy, Internet of Sensors
1. Introduction
Researchers lately refer to the term ”The Internet of Things (IoT)” as the revolution of the future. According to forecasts
from Cisco Systems [1], by 2020, the Internet will consist of over 50 billion connected things, including, sensors, actuators,
GPS devices, mobile devices, and all smart things that we can envision in the future. Currently, IBM has decided to combine
several products and services into an offer called IoT Solutions Practice [2] to allow the customers to find all IBM IoT offers at
the same location. For example, IBM offers the Watson IoT platform [3], which combines scanning, security, and blockchain
technology for authentication with a set of APIs such as IBM’s SoftLayer cloud infrastructure [4]. The IoT can be realized
under three scopes, namely, internet-oriented (middleware), things-oriented (sensors) and semantic-oriented (knowledge) [5].
According to Atzori et al. [6], IoT can be represented as a three-layered architectural model, which consists of the application
layer, the network layer, and the sensing layer.
As shown in Fig. 1, IoT has made its entrance in four fields, including, (1) Machine to machine communications (M2M),
(2) Internet of Vehicles (IoV), (3) Internet of Energy (IoE), and (4) Internet of Sensors (IoS). M2M is a technology crucial for
the realization of IoT, which is based on different protocols such as the protocol Stack [7]. The IoV is based on the concept
of Vehicular Cloud, which offers access to the Internet, and is temporarily created by inter-connecting resources available on
the vehicles along with Road Side Units (RSUs) [8, 9, 10]. According to ARTEMIS-project [11], the IoE is the connection of
smart grids with the internet in order to enable intelligent control of energy production, storage and distribution. The IoS
refers to connecting sensors with the Internet using ZigBee and other IEEE 802.15.4 based protocols [12].
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Figure 1: Internet of Things (IoT) in four environments, including: (1) Machine to machine communications (M2M), (2) Internet of Vehicles (IoV),
(3) Internet of Energy (IoE), and (4) Internet of Sensors (IoS)
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Figure 2: Vision of the IoT with main features and challenges
The vision of the IoT will advance based on many new features and coping with novel challenges, as shown in Fig. 2,
including, cloud computing, M2M, IoS, IoE, IoV, social networks, software defined optical networks (SDONs), and fifth
generation (5G) cellular networks. The IoT data which will be produced from billions of interactions between devices and
people is not only going to be massive, but also complex and it will suffer from many security and privacy problems, especially
regarding the authentication between devices. To resolve these security issues, researchers in the field of computer security
have developed many authentication protocols for or applied in the context of the IoT. In a recent survey paper which
was published in 2015 [13] authors reviewed the state of the art of RFID authentication schemes which used elliptic curve
cryptography and were used in healthcare environments. The aim of our survey paper is to provide a comprehensive and
systematic review of recent studies on published authentication protocols for the IoT in four environments, including, M2M,
IoV, IoE, and IoS. More precisely, we select and in-detail examine more than forty authentication protocols. The original set
of papers was formed from the searchers run on SCOPUS and Web of Science from the period between 2005 and 2016 (See
Tab. 1 for a breakdown of publication dates). The main contributions of this paper are:
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Table 1: Publication date breakdown - Surveyed papers (authentication protocols)
Papers Year
[14] 2005
[15][16] 2006
[17] 2007
[18] [19] 2008
[20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] 2010
[28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] 2011
[35] [36] [37] [38] [39] 2012
[40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] 2013
[49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] 2014
[55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] 2015
[64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] 2016
[81] 2017
• We survey around seventy survey articles published in the recent years that deal with the IoT.
• We discuss the authentication protocols in M2M, IoV, IoE, and IoS that were evaluated under thirty-five attacks. Then,
we focus on four attacks, which are mostly studied in earlier works, namely, man-in-the-middle attack, impersonation
attack, forging attack, and replay attack.
• We present various countermeasures and formal security verification techniques used by authentication protocols for the
IoT.
• We present a side-by-side comparison in a tabular form of the current state-of-the-art of authentication protocols (more
than forty) proposed for the IoT from five different aspects, namely, network model, goals, main processes, computation
complexity, and communication overhead.
• We discuss the open issues for M2M, IoV, IoE, and IoS.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we summarize the existing survey works on different
aspects of the IoT idea. In section 3, we present an overview of threat models in the IoT. Then in section 4, we discuss the
countermeasures and formal security verification techniques. In section 5, we present a side-by-side comparison in a tabular
form for the current state-of-the-art of authentication protocols proposed for M2M, IoV, IoE, and IoS. Finally, we identify the
future directions 6 and conclude the article 7.
2. Surveys articles for the IoT
There exist around seventy survey articles published in the recent years that deal with Internet of Things, focusing on
different aspects of the IoT idea, e.g. networking, applications, standardization, social interactions, security and many more.
These survey articles are categorized in terms of field of research and year of publication as shown in tables 2 and 3. As it is
seen from Tab. 3 the Internet of Things concepts attracts more and more attention as the years pass by and although a lot
of different areas related to IoT are covered from previous review works, no survey article exists that thoroughly investigates
authentication protocols that are especially developed for this new technology or better say this blend of technologies and
systems. In this section we will briefly present all these survey articles grouped as shown in Tab. 2 and will discuss in more
depth previous work that deal with security and privacy issues of the IoT.
The first survey article in the literature that was dealing with the IoT concept was published back in 2009 by Cooper et
al. [82] and focused on the challenges for database management in the IoT. Seeing the IoT from that point of view they found
that the technical priorities that needed to be addressed in order to support the interconnection of every device was proper
indexing, archiving, development of smart agents the use of XML for achieving Interoperability and novel systems that will
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Table 2: Areas of research of each survey article for the IoT
DD: Data quality and Database Management, MW: Middleware, AP: Applications, HD: Healthcare domain, SE: Smart environments, SP: Security and privacy, Exp:
Experimentation, Net: Networking, ST: Standardization, Arch: Architecture SR: Searching, RFID: RFID technology, Soc: Social internet of things, CoA: Context-awareness,
DM: Data mining, IIoT: Industrial Internet of Things
Ref. DD MW AP HD SE SP Exp Net ST Arch SR RFID Soc CoA DM IIoT
[82, 83, 84, 85] X
[6, 86, 87, 88, 89] X
[6, 90, 91] X
[6, 92, 93] X
[94] X
[95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 85] X
[101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106] X
[107, 108, 109, 110, 111] X
[112] X
[113, 114, 102, 96, 115, 97, 116, 117, 118, 119,
120, 121, 122, 13, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128]
X
[129, 130] X
[131, 132, 133, 134] X
[6, 101, 102, 107, 135, 5, 97, 136, 137, 138, 139,
140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145]
X
[146] X
[147, 148] X
[108] X
Table 3: Year of publication
Ref. Year
[82] 2009
[6, 113, 114] 2010
[94, 95, 86, 101, 88, 96, 135, 112] 2011
[102, 87, 107, 115, 129, 136, 131] 2012
[103, 5, 97, 104, 116, 105] 2013
[146, 108, 117, 147, 109, 118, 92, 110, 119, 137, 106, 138, 120, 122, 133, 139] 2014
[140, 13, 141, 123, 90, 124, 125, 148, 130, 98] 2015
[121, 142, 89, 126, 93, 143, 144, 145, 83, 111, 127, 91, 84, 99, 100, 85, 134, 128] 2016
be able to offer efficient and secure transaction management. In a later survey article that was published in 2010, Atzori et
al. [6], discussed the vision of ‘anytime, anywhere, any media, anything’ communications that the IoT would bring in our
everyday lives. Based on their research they had spotted two important technologies that needed to be applied in order to
bring IoT into life, Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) and Web 2.0. The same year, the first survey article that dealt with
security and privacy issues related to IoT was published [113]. In this article Weber et al., discussed the different measures
that were needed in order to ensure the architecture’s resilience to attacks, data authentication, access control and client
privacy. The article dealt with security and privacy issues from the legislation perspective mostly due to the fact that the IoT
was more an idea back in 2010 that a concrete system yet. Another article dealing with security and privacy was published
in 2010 from Medaglia et al. [114]. The article tried to present a short term and a long term vision of the IoT along with the
security issues and solutions that would be needed.
In 2011 there were published eight survey articles that focused on the IoT [94, 95, 86, 101, 88, 96, 135, 112]. In [94]
authors conducted a thorough analysis of the different publicly available testbeds. In [95] Mainetti et al., discussed about
the necessary standards and solutions needed to guarantee the integration among several heterogeneous WSNs thus enabling
smart objects to participate to the IoT. Bandyopadhyay et al. in [86], surveyed the state-of-the-art of the different approaches
that middleware solutions used in order to support some of the functionalities necessary for operate in the IoT domain.
Similar to this work, authors in [88] surveyed the major challenges posed to service-oriented middleware towards sustaining
a service-based Internet of Things. Bandyopadhyay et al. [101], published an interesting survey article about the current
developments related to IoT and the open issues back in 2011. The article managed to spot most of the challenges that IoT
had and still has to face nowadays, e.g. managing large amount of information and mining large volume of data, managing
4
Table 4: A comparison of related surveys in the literature (Surveys on Security and Privacy for the IoT)
X:indicates fully supported; X: indicates not supported; 0: indicates partially supported.
Survey on Security and Privacy
for the IoT
Privacy
preserving
schemes
Authentication
Protocols
Comments
Weber (2010) [113] 0 X - Presented milestones of an adequate legal framework for IoT privacy.
Medaglia and Serbanati (2010) [114] 0 X - Presented a Short-Term and Long-Term vision for IoT privacy.
Roman et al. (2011) [96] X X - Analyzed some key management systems for sensor networks in the context of the IoT (public
key cryptography and pre-shared keys).
Miorandi et al. (2012) [102] 0 X - Presented some security challenges in IoT, including, Data confidentiality, Privacy, and Trust.
Suo et al. (2012) [115] X X - Discussed the security requirements in each level for IoT (four key levels, i.e., recognition layer,
network layer, support layer, and application layer)
Aggarwal et al. (2013) [97] 0 X - Discussed the privacy in data collection, and during data transmission and sharing.
Roman et al. (2013) [116] X X - Presented the security issues in distributed IoT systems.
Yan et al. (2014) [117] X X - Surveyed the privacy-preserving schemes IoT, including, database query, scientific computa-
tions, intrusion detection, and data mining.
Jing et al. (2014) [118] X X - Discussed the security issues and technical solutions in WSNs.
Chabridon et al. (2014) [119] X X - Surveyed the state of the art of privacy technology from the perspective of the IoT.
Ziegeldorf et al. [120] X X - Surveyed the privacy threats and challenges in the IoT.
Keoh et al. (2014) [122] X X - Presented an overview of the efforts in the IETF to standardize security solutions for the IoT
ecosystem.
Sicari et al. (2015) [13] 0 X - Discussed the privacy, trust, enforcement, secure middleware, and mobile security in the IoT
Granja et al. (2015) [123] X 0 - Discussed IoT communications and security at the physical and MAC layers.
Sadeghi et al. (2015) [124] X X - Discussed an introduction to Industrial IoT systems with the related security and privacy chal-
lenges.
Nguyen et al. (2015) [125] 0 X - Surveyed the secure communication protocols for the IoT, including, asymmetric key schemes
and symmetric key pre-distribution schemes.
He et al. (2015)[130] X 0 - Analyzed only the RFID authentication schemes for the IoT in healthcare environment using
elliptic curve cryptography
Xie et al. (2016) [121] X X - Reviewed the security issues for Web of Things.
Singh et al. (2016) [126] X X - Analyzed the state of cloud-supported IoT to make explicit the security considerations.
Li et al. (2016) [127] X X - Analyzed the security requirements and potential threats in a four-layer architecture for the
IoT
Airehrour et al. (2016) [128] X X - Analyzed the security of routing protocols for the IoT.
Our Work 0 X - Surveyed the authentication protocols for the IoT in four environments, including: (1) Machine
to machine communications (M2M), (2) Internet of Vehicles (IoV), (3) Internet of Energy (IoE),
and (4) Internet of Sensors (IoS).
heterogeneity, ensuring security privacy and trust among others. Feasible solutions for the problem of establishing a session
key between a client and a server in the context of the Internet of Things were surveyed in [96], where the authors considered
the scenario where at least one peer were sensor nodes. They especially focused on different cryptography solutions and how
these could be applied to server and client nodes. Ma et al. in [135] gave an overview of the objectives of the IoT and the
challenges involved in IoT development while in [112] Zhang et al., covered the topic of how to build an appropriate search
engine for IoT, a topic that was spotted from Cooper in [82] back in 2009 as a challenge to be addressed in the future.
During 2012 and 2013 the following fourteen survey articles were published [102, 87, 107, 115, 129, 103, 5, 97, 104, 136,
131, 116, 132, 105] dealing with standardization, applications, architecture, security and privacy issues of the IoT. Articles
[103, 104, 105] surveyed standardization issues and how the IETF Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) working group
focuses on facilitating the integration of constrained devices with the Internet at the service level. These articles pointed out
that all the standardized protocols are only a starting point for exploring additional open issues such as resource representation,
security and privacy, energy efficiency and so on. Authors in [102, 5] gave a general overview of the current vision, applications,
architectural elements and future challenges and directions of the IoT. Miorandi et al. in [102] discussed the potential impact
of the IoT on smart home automation, smart cities, environmental monitoring, health care, smart businesses and security and
surveillance making very clear, maybe for the first time, that the IoT concept involves every current or future technology that
is going to be introduced in order to make our life better. Authors in [87] published a survey about middleware solutions
for IoT similar to [86, 88], presenting all the technical challenges of designing middleware systems for the IoT. Domingo
et al. in [107] performed a more narrow but extensive survey of the IoT for people with disabilities. Authors spotted the
relevant application scenarios and main benefits along with the key research challenges, like customization, self management
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and security and privacy issues. They argued that as brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) are becoming commercial, they will
also be a part of the IoT world. Articles [115, 116] focused on security and privacy issues as they were identified back in 2012
and 2013 respectively. Both articles agree that key management, legislation while authors in [116] take one step further and
propose that grouping of the IoT devices and creating the so called intranet of things could help impose security mechanisms
more effectively. Survey articles [129, 97, 136, 131, 132] researched the IoT system from different perspectives. In [129] authors
discussed about RFID technology and its applications in the IoT and in [136] the role of fog computing in the IoT. Aggarwal et
al. [97], conducted a thorough research about data analytics, data mining and data management in the IoT world. The article
discusses all the issues related to data analytics and IoT, like real time and big data analytics challenges, effective crawling
and searching in massive databases, privacy issues in data collections, data sharing and management and data security issues.
Finally articles [131] and [132] survey for the first time the social concept of the IoT, the so called Social Internet of Things,
a concept that later will raise a lot of attraction and research works.
During 2014 and 2015 more than twenty five new survey articles about IoT were published [146, 108, 117, 147, 109, 118,
92, 110, 119, 137, 106, 138, 120, 122, 133, 139, 140, 13, 141, 123, 90, 124, 125, 148, 130, 98]. Except from articles that discussed
general issues regarding IoT [137, 106, 139, 140], e.g. applications, challenges, trends and open issues, other papers focused
on specific applications or research areas that are connected to the IoT idea. Authors in [146, 109, 119, 141] surveyed context
awareness from the IoT perspective covering several aspects, like context-aware computing [146], context-aware product
development [109] and quality of context and privacy [119]. Authors in all three articles agree that IoT thus brings new
opportunities by enabling enriched context-aware services, but it also raises new challenges that need to be addressed. Zanella
et al. [92] focused specifically to an urban IoT system which is another term to describe the smart city environment. In
contrast to the previous years during 2014 and 2015 a big proportion of the survey articles focus on security and privacy
issues related to the IoT [117, 118, 120, 122, 13, 123, 124, 125], revealing the significance that security was beginning to
have for Cyber Physical systems. Cyber Physical systems need to rely on IoT enabled technologies which can be effectively
and efficiently supported and assisted by Cloud Computing infrastructures and platforms. The integration of IoT and Cloud
computing was thoroughly surveyed from Botta et al. [138] where also the possibility of exploiting fog computing capabilities
for supporting the IoT concept was discussed. Data mining in the IoT context were surveyed by Tsai et al. [147] and Chen
et al. [148]. Authors in [147] presented a good summary of the potentials of applying data mining technologies to the IoT
could have to people, the system itself, and other interconnected systems. Authors in [148] took a step further and based
on their survey and analysis proposed a big data mining system for IoT. Ortiz et al. [133], surveyed the Social Internet of
Things and compared to the earlier survey articles [131, 132] proposed a generic SIoT architecture which consists of actors, a
central intelligent system, an interface and the internet. Two articles focused on IoT-based health care technologies [130, 90],
covering new platforms, applications and security and privacy issues that arise. Authors in [108] conducted an extensive
literature review about the current status and future research opportunities regarding the use of IoT in industries, the so
called Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) while in [110] authors tried to identify the impact of the Internet of Things (IoT)
on Enterprise Systems in modern manufacturing.
During 2016 over fifteen new survey articles that focused on the IoT concept were published [121, 142, 89, 126, 93, 143,
144, 145, 83, 111, 127, 91, 84, 99, 100, 85, 134, 128]. Following the technology development three of the articles published this
year focused on the integration of the cloud and the IoT, the applications, the requirements and the security issues that arise
from it [142, 126, 145]. Security was also one aspect that was covered from a number of survey articles [126, 127, 128]. Authors
in [127] covered several aspects of IoT security, e.g. general devices security, communication security, network security, and
application while in [128] mechanisms that reassure secure routing were investigated. In contrast to previous years, surveys
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Classification of
attacks in the IoT
- Passive attacks
- Active attacks
- Identity-based attacks
- Location-based attacks
- Eavesdropping-based attacks
- Manipulation-based attacks
- Service-based attacks
- Internal attacks
- External attacks
- Key-based attacks
- Data-based attacks
- Impersonation-based attacks
- Physical-based attacks
Figure 3: Classification of attacks in the IoT
that published during 2016 covered new areas, such as SDN and virtualization [99], economic and pricing theory in IoT [85],
social internet of vehicles [134] and data quality [83]. Other topics covered from the survey articles were middleware [89],
context aware computing [144], applications of IoT in the healthcare industry [91], cognitive radio technology [100], data
models [84], mobile crowd sensing strategies [143],the deployment of IoT in smart environments [93] and the main proposed
architectures for IoT [111]. Xie et al. [121] surveys the security of the Web of Things (WoT) which is aimed to provide any
electronic item (smart cards, sensors, etc.) with a URL.
Among the aforementioned surveys, the security and privacy issues that are related to the IoT was thoroughly covered
and analyzed [113, 114, 102, 96, 115, 97, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 13, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128]. As it is shown in
Tab. 4 data authentication and integrity was only covered partially from He et al. [130] while the rest of the articles did not
cover this major security aspect. In this article we tend to survey authentication protocols for the IoT in four environments,
including: (1) Machine to machine communications (M2M), (2) Internet of Vehicles (IoV), (3) Internet of Energy (IoE), and
(4) Internet of Sensors (IoS). Based on this thorough analysis open issues and future directions are identified that combine
both innovative research along with the application, through appropriate adaptation, of existing solutions from other fields.
We believe that this study will help researchers focus on the important aspects of authentication issues in the IoT area and
will guide them towards their future research.
3. Threat models
In this section, we discuss the threat models in the IoT. The summary of thirty-five attacks in M2M, IoV, IoE, IoS and
defense protocols are given in Tab. 5, Tab. 6, Tab. 7, and Tab. 8, respectively. We focus on five attacks, which are mostly
used by authors that propose new authentications protocols for evaluating their methods, namely, man-in-the-middle attack,
impersonation attack, forging attack, and replay attack. Generally, the classification of attacks [160, 161, 162, 163] frequently
mentioned in the literature is done using the following four types, as shown in Fig. 3:
1. Type A: Passive or active;
2. Type B: Internal or external;
3. Type C [164]: Key-based attacks, data-based attacks, impersonation-based attacks, and physical-based attacks;
4. Type D [165]: Identity-based attacks, location-based attacks, eavesdropping-based attacks, manipulation-based attack,
and service-based attacks.
3.1. Man-in-the-middle attack
The Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack is one of the most well known attacks in the IoT. With MITM attack, an adversary
can spoof the identities of two honest nodes (N1 and N2) involved in a network exchange and pass N1 for N2 and vice versa,
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Table 5: Summary of attacks in Machine to machine communications (M2M) and defense protocols
X:indicates fully supported; X: indicates not supported; 0: indicates partially supported.
Authentication protocols for M2M
Adversary model [65] [64] [49] [41] [37] [56] [50] [149] [40]
Audio replay attack X 0 X 0 0 0 X X 0
Changing distance attack X X X X X X X X X
Same-type-device attack X X X X X X X X X
Composition attack X X X X X X X X X
Redirection attack 0 X 0 X X X 0 X X
Man-in-the-middle attack 0 X 0 X 0 0 X X X
Substitution attack 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X
DoS attack X X X X X X X X X
Replay attack 0 X X X 0 X X X X
Forging attack X X X 0 X X X X X
Colluding attack 0 X X 0 X X 0 X X
Flooding attack 0 X X X X X 0 X 0
Side-channel attack 0 X X X X X 0 X 0
False messages attack 0 X X X 0 0 0 X 0
Sybil attack X X X X 0 0 X X 0
Movement tracking X X X X 0 X X X 0
Message modification X X X X 0 X X X X
Impersonation attack X X X X 0 X X X X
Guessing attack X X X X X X X X X
Stolen-verifier attack X X X X X X X X X
Wormhole attack 0 0 X 0 X 0 X X 0
Black hole attack 0 0 X 0 0 0 X X 0
Attribute-trace attack X X X X 0 X X X X
Eavesdropping attack X X X X 0 0 X X 0
Chosen-plaintext attack X X X X 0 X X X 0
Spam attack 0 X X X 0 0 X X 0
Identity theft attack 0 X X X X 0 X X X
User manipulation attack 0 X X X X 0 0 X 0
Routing attack 0 X X X X 0 X X X
Linkability attack 0 X X X X X X X X
Rejection attack X X X X X X X X X
Successive-response attack X X X X X X X X X
Packet analysis attack X 0 X X X 0 X X 0
Packet tracing attack X 0 X X X 0 X X 0
Brute-force attack 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X
Figure 4: MITM attack on GSM as defined by Conti et al. in [166], BTS : Base Transceiver Station; MS: Mobile Station
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Table 6: Summary of attacks in Internet of Vehicles (IoV) and defense protocols
X:indicates fully supported; X: indicates not supported; 0: indicates partially supported.
Authentication protocols for IoV
Adversary model [42] [43] [66] [67] [68] [69] [51] [55] [57]
Audio replay attack 0 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 X
Changing distance attack X X X X X X X X X
Same-type-device attack X X X X X X X X X
Composition attack X X X X X X X X X
Redirection attack 0 0 X X X X X X X
Man-in-the-middle attack X 0 0 X X X 0 X X
Substitution attack 0 0 0 X X 0 X X X
DoS attack X X X X X X X X X
Replay attack X X X X 0 0 0 X 0
Forging attack 0 X X X X 0 X X X
Colluding attack 0 X X 0 X X X X X
Flooding attack X X X 0 X X X X X
Side-channel attack X X X 0 X X X X X
False messages attack X X X X X X X X 0
Sybil attack 0 X X X X 0 X X 0
Movement tracking X X X X X X X X X
Message modification X X X X X X 0 X X
Impersonation attack X X X X X X X 0 X
Guessing attack X X X X X X X X 0
Stolen-verifier attack X X X X X X X X 0
Wormhole attack 0 0 X X 0 X 0 0 0
Black hole attack 0 0 X X 0 X 0 0 0
Attribute-trace attack X X X X X 0 X X 0
Eavesdropping attack X X 0 0 0 X X 0 0
Chosen-plaintext attack X X X 0 X X 0 X 0
Spam attack X X X 0 X 0 0 X X
Identity theft attack X X X 0 X X 0 X X
User manipulation attack X X X 0 X X 0 0 X
Routing attack 0 X 0 X 0 X 0 0 0
Linkability attack X X X X X 0 X 0 X
Rejection attack X X X X X 0 X 0 0
Successive-response attack X X X X X 0 X X X
Packet analysis attack 0 0 X X 0 0 X 0 0
Packet tracing attack 0 0 X X 0 0 X 0 0
Brute-force attack X X X X X 0 X 0 0
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Table 7: Summary of attacks in Internet of Energy (IoE) and defense protocols
X:indicates fully supported; X: indicates not supported; 0: indicates partially supported.
Authentication protocols for IoE
Adversary model [31] [52] [150] [151] [152] [153] [154] [58] [70]
Audio replay attack X X X X X X X X X
Changing distance attack 0 X X X X 0 0 0 X
Same-type-device attack X X X 0 X X X X X
Composition attack X X X X X X X X X
Redirection attack X X X 0 X 0 X X X
Man-in-the-middle attack 0 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0
Substitution attack X 0 X X X X 0 0 X
DoS attack X X 0 X X 0 X X 0
Replay attack 0 X 0 X X X X 0 X
Forging attack X 0 0 0 0 X X X X
Colluding attack X 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X
Flooding attack X 0 X 0 X X 0 0 0
Side-channel attack X X X X X 0 0 0 X
False messages attack 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
Sybil attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 0
Movement tracking 0 X X X X 0 X X 0
Message modification 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
Impersonation attack 0 0 X X 0 X 0 0 0
Guessing attack X 0 X 0 X X X X X
Stolen-verifier attack X X X X X X X X X
Wormhole attack X X 0 X X 0 0 0 0
Black hole attack X X 0 X X 0 0 0 0
Attribute-trace attack X X X 0 X 0 X X X
Eavesdropping attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chosen-plaintext attack X X X 0 X X X X X
Spam attack X X X 0 X X X X X
Identity theft attack X X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0
User manipulation attack X X X X 0 X X X 0
Routing attack X X 0 0 X X X X X
Linkability attack 0 X 0 0 X X 0 0 X
Rejection attack 0 X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0
Successive-response attack 0 X X 0 X X X X 0
Packet analysis attack 0 X 0 0 0 X 0 0 X
Packet tracing attack 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brute-force attack X X X X X X X 0 X
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Table 8: Summary of attacks in Internet of Sensors (IoS) and defense protocols
X:indicates fully supported; X: indicates not supported; 0: indicates partially supported.
Authentication protocols for IoS
Adversary model [71] [72] [155] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [81] [79] [156] [80] [157] [158] [159]
Audio replay attack X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Changing distance attack 0 X 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Same-type-device attack 0 X 0 X X X X X 0 X X X X X X X
Composition attack X 0 X X 0 0 X 0 0 X X X 0 0 0 0
Redirection attack X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Man-in-the-middle attack 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 0 X X X 0
Substitution attack 0 X X X X X 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X X X
DoS attack 0 0 0 X 0 X 0 X X 0 0 X 0 0 0 0
Replay attack X 0 X X 0 X X 0 X X X X X 0 0 X
Forging attack 0 X 0 X 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 X X 0
Colluding attack 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0
Flooding attack X 0 X X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Side-channel attack X 0 X X X X X X X X X X 0 X X X
False messages attack 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sybil attack 0 0 X 0 X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Movement tracking 0 0 X X 0 X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Message modification 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0
Impersonation attack X X 0 X X 0 0 X 0 X X X X 0 0 X
Guessing attack X X 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X 0 X 0
Stolen-verifier attack X X X 0 0 X X X X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0
Wormhole attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X X 0 X X X
Black hole attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X X 0 X X X
Attribute-trace attack X X X X X 0 X X 0 X X X 0 X X X
Eavesdropping attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chosen-plaintext attack X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0 0
Spam attack X X X 0 X X 0 X 0 X X X X 0 0 0
Identity theft attack 0 0 0 X X X 0 X 0 X X X 0 0 0 0
User manipulation attack 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Routing attack 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 X 0 X X X 0 X X X
Linkability attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 X X X 0 X X X
Rejection attack 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 X 0 X X X 0 X X X
Successive-response attack X X 0 X 0 X X X 0 X X X X X X X
Packet analysis attack 0 0 X 0 0 X X X X X X X X 0 0 0
Packet tracing attack 0 0 X 0 X X X X X X X X X 0 0 0
Brute-force attack X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
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Table 9: Approaches for detecting and avoiding the man-in-the-middle attack
Protocol Data attacked Approach
Lai et al. (2016) [64] - Communication channel between the mobile management entity and the
home subscriber server
- Mutual authentication and key agreement between multiple
M2M devices and the core network simultaneously
Lai et al. (2013) [41] - The data between the mobiles equipment’s and the 3GPP network - Authentication acknowledge phase
Cspedes et al. (2013) [42] - Identify a shared key between two legitimate users;
- Impersonate a mobile router or a relay router;
- The keys generated at the mobile router and the relay
router for authentication are based on the concept of sym-
metric polynomials
Dolev et al. (2016) [69] - Communication channel between the vehicles - Twofold authentication;
- Periodic certificate restore;
Nicanfar et al. (2011) [151] - Communication channel between the smart meter and the authentica-
tion agent;
- Communication channel between the authentication agent and the se-
curity associate (SA) server
- All packets are fully encrypted with the receivers public key
Nicanfar et al. (2014) [154] - The passwords of smart meter - Changing the server password more often
Das (2016) [75] - The login request message during the login phase - Password and biometric update phase
Lai et al. (2013) [40] - Can occur while connecting to a base station - Authentication acknowledge phase
Farash et al. (2016) [78] - Data between the sensor node, users and gateway node - Mutual authentication
Jiang et al. (2016) [80] - Data between the Sensor node, users and Gateway node - Mutual authentication
Wu et al. (2016) [157] - Data between the Sensor node, users and Gateway node - Mutual authentication
Das et al. (2016) [158] - The lost/stolen smart card of a legal user - Password change phase
i.e., takes control of the communication channel between N1 and N2. Under this control, an adversary can intercept, modify,
change, or replace target victims’ communication traffic. However, we note here that there is a good survey article published
in 2016 by Conti et al. in [166], which presents a comprehensive survey on MITM attacks. Specifically, authors in [166]
classify MITM attacks in three different categories, namely, 1) MITM based on impersonation techniques, 2) MITM based
on the communication channel, and 3) MITM based on the location of an adversary. As presented in Fig. 4, at any moment
an adversary can set-up a connection between False BTS and Legitimate MS, where False MS impersonates the victim’s MS
to the real network by resending the identity information. Moreover, as presented in Tab. 9, there are twelve authentication
protocols for the IoT, which can detect and avoid the MITM attack. The four authentication protocols in [64, 78, 80, 157] use
the idea of mutual authentication. The two authentication protocols [41] and [40] use the idea of authentication acknowledge
phase. With the protocol [151], all packets are fully encrypted with the receiver’s public key, which can prevent the MITM
attack. On the other hand, with the protocol [42], when the keys generated at the mobile router and the relay router for
authentication are based on the concept of symmetric polynomials, an adversary can not identify a shared key between two
legitimate users making it impossible for him to impersonate a mobile router or a relay router. In addition, both protocols
[154] and [75] are based on a password and biometric update phase in order to prevent that an adversary can impersonate the
passwords of a smart meter.
3.2. Impersonation and forging attack
Under the impersonation and forging attack in the IoS, an adversary can eavesdrop or intercept the login request message
of previous sessions over the public/open channel during authentication protocol execution. After that, he can modify and
re-transmit the message to the user in order to impersonate as a valid user, as defined by Amin et al. [73]. We note that this
attack is analyzed more in authentication protocols that are produced for the IoS. Moreover, as presented in Tab. 10 there are
sixteen authentication protocols for the IoT, which can detect the impersonation and forging attack. The protocol [43] uses
two ideas, namely, 1) linear search algorithm and 2) binary search algorithm. The protocol [50] uses strong anonymous access
authentication and user tracking on a disputed access request, to prevent the impersonation and forging attack. Besides, the
idea of using a password for detecting the impersonation of the gateway node is presented by four authentication protocols
[80, 159, 56], and [158]. In addition, the hash mechanism which is applied on the shared key between gateway wireless node
and sensors can prevent the impersonation of a sensor.
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Table 10: Approaches for detecting and avoiding the impersonation and forging attack
Protocol Data attacked Approach
Wasef et al. (2013) [43] - Forge the revocation check - Linear search algorithm
- Binary search algorithm
Chung et al. (2016) [72] - Impersonate the mobile node - Login and authentication phase
Das (2016) [75] - Eavesdrop or intercept the login request message of the
previous sessions
- Authentication and key agreement phase
Wu et al. (2016) [157] - The data produced by the smart card in the Login phase - Elliptic curve cryptosystem
Das et al. (2016) [158] - Eavesdrop, modify, or delete the contents of the transmitted
messages
- Password and biometric update
Sun et al. (2015) [56] - Information leakage of the M2M server - The authentication process based on password
Lai et al. (2014) [50] - Forge and/or modifies the authentication messages - Strong anonymous access authentication;
- User tracking on a disputed access request;
Dolev et al. (2016) [69] - Forge and/or modifies the authentication messages - Two rounds of session key
Kumari et al. (2016) [71] - Impersonation of user and sensor node - Gateway wireless node does not maintain any record to store user-
specific information
Amin et al. (2016) [73] - Intercepts the login request message - Authentication and key agreement
Gope et al. (2016) [74] - The server’s secret key - Adversary has no knowledge about the secret identity of the gateway
Jiang et al. (2016) [77] - Gets the user smart card - The hash mechanism using the shared key between gateway wireless
node and sensor
Srinivas et al. (2017) [81] - Impersonation of the gateway node - Non-invertible cryptographic one way hash function property
Kumari et al. (2016) [79] - Impersonation of the gateway node - Secret session key
Jiang et al. (2016) [80] - Gets the user smart card - Password
Liu and Chung (2016) [159] - Intercepts the login request message - Password
Table 11: Approaches for detecting and avoiding the replay attack
Protocol Data attacked Approach
Lai et al. (2013) [41] - Replaying the data between the mobiles equipment’s and the 3GPP
network
- Random numbers
Sun et al. (2015) [56] - Replaying the intercepted login message - Random numbers
Lai et al. (2013) [40] - Replaying the message between serving gateway and home subscriber
server.
- Random numbers
Cspedes et al. (2013) [42] - Replaying one of the router solicitation messages - Random numbers
Wasef et al. (2013) [43] - Replaying the disseminated messages in IoV - Timestamp
Shao et al. (2016) [66] - Replaying the disseminated messages in IoV - Timestamp
Zhang et al. (2015) [55] - Replaying the disseminated messages in IoV - Timestamp
Li et al. (2014) [52] - Replaying the electricity consumption reports - Merkle hash tree technique
Nicanfar et al. (2011) [151] - Replaying the electricity consumption reports - Timestamp
Chim et al. (2011) [152] - Replaying the electricity consumption reports - Timestamp
Fouda et al. (2011) [153] - Replaying the electricity consumption reports - Timestamp
Nicanfar et al. (2014) [154] - Forwarding a previous acknowledgment from the smart meter to the
server
- Timestamp
Mahmood et al. (2016) [70] - Intercept messages by home area network and replay those archaic mes-
sages to building area network gateway
- Timestamp
Kumari et al. (2016) [71] - Intercept and replay the login request to gateway wireless node - Timestamp
Jan et al. (2016) [155] - Eavesdrop on advertisement packets and/or join-request packets and
replay in other parts of the network.
- Hash function and ring keys
Amin et al. (2016) [73] - Replaying the message in the IoS - Timestamp
Das (2016) [75] - Replaying the login request message - Timestamp
Chang et al. (2016) [76] - Replaying the login request message - Timestamp
Farash et al. (2016) [78] - Replaying the login request message - Timestamp
Srinivas et al. (2017) [81] - Replaying the messages in the IoS - Timestamp
Kumari et al. (2016) [79] - Intercept and replay the login request to gateway wireless node - Timestamp
Jiang et al. (2016) [80] - Intercept the login request - Timestamp
Liu and Chung [159] - Intercept the login request - Timestamp
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Figure 5: Replay attack, MS: Mobile Station
Figure 6: Classification of the existing authentication protocols for the IoT Based on the cryptosystems
3.3. Replay attack
The Replay attacks are MITM attacks, which consist of intercepting data packets and retransmitting them as is (without
any decryption) to the destination server, as shown in Fig. 5 (intercepting D3 and retransmitting it). Under this attack, an
adversary can obtain the same rights as the user. However, there are twenty-four authentication protocols for the IoT, which
can detect and avoid the Replay attack, as presented in Tab. 11. These authentication protocols use three ideas, namely,
Timestamp, Hash function, and Random numbers. The idea of random numbers is used by [41, 56, 40], and [42]. The idea
of hash function is used by protocols [52] and [155], such as the IPSec protocol implements an anti-replay mechanism based
on Message Authentication Code (MAC) [167]. In addition, the idea of Timestamp in the encrypted messages is used by
[43, 66, 55, 52, 151, 152, 153, 154, 70, 71, 155, 73, 75, 76, 78, 81, 79, 80, 159].
4. Countermeasures and formal security verification techniques
In order to satisfy the authentication model for secure IoT, namely, mutual authentication, perfect forward secrecy,
anonymity, and untraceability, the authentication protocols use both cryptosystems and non-cryptosystems countermeasures.
Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15 present the cryptosystems and countermeasures used in authentication protocols for M2M, IoV,
IoE, and IoS, respectively. In this section, we will discuss the countermeasures and present the formal security verification
techniques used in these authentication protocols for the IoT.
4.1. Countermeasures
Based on the cryptosystems, the existing authentication protocols for the IoT can mainly be classified into three categories:
symmetric-cryptosystem based, asymmetric-cryptosystem-based, and hybrid protocols, as shown in Fig. 6. As presented in
the following tables (12, 13, 14, and 15), most authentication protocols use a secure cryptographic hash function [168].
14
Table 12: Cryptosystems and Countermeasures used in Authentication protocols for Machine to machine communications (M2M)
Authentication protocols for M2M
Cryptosystems & Countermeasures [65] [64] [49] [41] [37] [56] [50] [149] [40]
Secure cryptographic hash function [168] X X X X X X X
Original data acquisition X
Spatial-Domain transformation X
Time-domain transformation X
Correlation coefficient-based matching algorithm (C-MA) X
Deviation ratio-based matching algorithm (D-MA) X
Aggregate message authentication codes (AMACs) [169] X X
Certificateless aggregate signature [170] X
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [171] X
ID-based signature scheme [172] X
Advanced encryption standard (AES) [173] X
Hybrid Linear Combination Encryption [174] X
Table 13: Cryptosystems and Countermeasures used in Authentication protocols for Internet of Vehicles (IoV)
Authentication protocols for IoV
Cryptosystems & Countermeasures [42] [43] [66] [67] [68] [69] [51] [55] [57]
Secure cryptographic hash function [168] X X X X X X X
Proxy Mobile IP (PMIP) [175] X
Symmetric Polynomials [176] X
Search Algorithms [177] X
Group Signature [178] [179] X
Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [180] X
TESLA Scheme [181, 182, 183] X
ECDSA Signature [184] X
Multiplicative secret sharing technique [185] X
Identity-based Public Key Cryptosystem [186] X
Identity-based aggregate signature [187] X
Digital signatures [188] X
Anonymous attribute-based group setup scheme [189] X
Keyed-hashing for message authentication (HMAC) [190] X
Table 14: Cryptosystems and Countermeasures used in Authentication protocols for Internet of Energy (IoE)
Authentication protocols for IoE
Cryptosystems & Countermeasures [31] [52] [150] [151] [152] [153] [154] [58] [70]
Secure cryptographic hash function [168] X X X X
HORS scheme [191] X
Heavy signing light verification (HSLV) [191] X
Light signing heavy verification (LSHV) [191] X
Merkle Hash tree technique [192] X
Short signatures (BLS) [193] X
Batch verification [194] X
Signature aggregation [195] X
Identity-based Public Key Cryptosystem [186] X
Public-key encryption, such as RSA [196] X X
HMAC, such as SHA-1 [197] and MD5 [198] X X X
Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol [199] X
EIBC mechanism [200] X
ID-based cryptography (IBC) [201] X
Digital signatures [188] X
Homomorphic Encryption [202] X
Bloom Filter [203] X
Commitment scheme X
Symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm [199] X
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As presented in Tab. 12, the protocol [149] uses three cryptosystems, namely, original data acquisition, spatial-domain
transformation, and time-domain transformation. The protocol [65] use two matching algorithms, namely, correlation coefficient-
based matching algorithm (C-MA) and deviation ratio-based matching algorithm (D-MA). The aggregate message authenti-
cation codes (AMACs) [169] is used by both schemes [64] and [40]. The AMAC tool is a tuple of the following probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms: Authentication algorithm, Aggregation algorithm, and Verification algorithm. The Authentica-
tion algorithm outputs a tag tag, where the aggregate of tags can be simply computing the XOR of all the tag values; i.e.,
tag = tag1
⊕
tag2
⊕ · · ·⊕ tagl, where 1, . . . , l are identifiers. The protocol [49] uses certificateless aggregate signature
[170], which enables an algorithm to aggregate n signatures of n distinct messages from n users into a single short signa-
ture. In addition, the certificateless aggregate signature scheme is secure against existential forgery in the chosen aggregate
model. For an aggregating set of n users {U1, . . . , Un} with identities {ID1, . . . , IDn} and the corresponding public keys
{upk1, . . . , upkn}, and message-signature pairs (m1, σ1 = (U1, V1)) , . . . , (mn, σn = (Un, Vn)) from {U1, . . . , Un} respectively,
the aggregate signature generator computes V =
∑n
i=1 Vi and outputs σn = (U1, . . . , Un, V ) as an aggregate signature. The
protocol [41] use Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [171], which is an anonymous key agreement protocol. The protocol
[37] uses ID-based signature scheme [172] that consists of four algorithms, Setup, Extract, Sign, and Verify. With Setup
algorithm, the trust authority chooses efficiently computable monomorphisms. The trust authority performs the Extract al-
gorithm when a signer requests the secret key corresponding to their identity. The Sign algorithm produce a signature from
the user with identity ID on the message m. Therefore, the protocol [56] uses advanced encryption standard (AES) [173],
which is a symmetric encryption standard intended to replace the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [204] that has become
too weak in view of current attacks. The protocol [50] uses the Linear Combination Encryption (LCE) [174], which is an
extension of ElGamal encryption [205] that is secure in groups where the Decision Diffie–Hellman (DDH) problem is easy but
the Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem is hard. With the LCE scheme [174], a user’s public and secret keys are
defined as pk = (u, v, w1 = u
x, w2 = v
y) and sk = (x, y), where u, v ← G1 and x, y ← Z∗p . The message M is encrypted
to (D1 = u
a, D2 = v
b, D3 = M.w
a
1w
b
2) where a, b ∈ Z∗p are random. Then, the original message M is decrypted from the
ciphertext (D1, D2, D3) by D3.(D
x
1 .D
y
2)
−1
.
As presented in Tab. 13, the protocol [42] uses both countermeasures, namely, Proxy Mobile IP (PMIP) [175] and
Symmetric Polynomials [176]. The PMIP is a localized network-based IP mobility protocol (RFC 5213 [206]) that defines two
entities: the Mobile Access Gateway (MAG) and the Local Mobility Anchor (LMA). The symmetric polynomial is defined as
any polynomial of two or more variables that achieves the interchangeability property, i.e., f(x, y) = f(y, x). For example,
given two users identities 1 and 2, and the symmetric polynomial f (x, y) = x2y2 +xy+ 10, the resultant evaluation functions
are f (1, y) = y2 + y + 10 and f (2, y) = 4y2 + 2y + 10, respectively. Then, if user 1 evaluates its function f (1, y) for user
2, it obtains f (1, 2) = 16. In the same way, f (2, y) for user 1, user 2 obtains f (1, 2) = 16. As result, both users share a
secret key, 16, without transmitting any additional messages to each other. Contrary to this idea of symmetric polynomials,
the protocol [43] uses the idea of search algorithms [177], which include non-optimized search algorithms such as linear search
algorithm, and optimized search algorithms such as binary search algorithm, and lookup hash tables. In another work [178]
Chaum and van Heyst introduce the idea of group signatures in order to providing anonymity for signers. The protocol [66]
uses this idea based on the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption and the Decision Linear assumption. The protocol [67] uses
three countermeasures, namely, 1) Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [180], 2) TESLA scheme [181, 182, 183], and 3) Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [184]. The MHT is a binary tree structure where each leaf is assigned a hash value and
an inner node is assigned the hash value of its children. To achieve source authentication, the TESLA scheme uses one-way
hash chains with the delayed disclosure of keys based on symmetric cryptography. The protocol [68] uses multiplicative secret
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Table 15: Cryptosystems and Countermeasures used in Authentication protocols for Internet of Sensors (IoS)
Authentication protocols for IoS
Cryptosystems & Countermeasures [71] [72] [155] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [81] [79] [156] [80] [157]
Secure cryptographic hash function [168] v v X v v v v v v X X X X
Chebyshev Chaotic Maps [207] v
Chebyshev Polynomials [208] v
ID-based cryptography (IBC) [201] v v v
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [209] v
Biometric X
Password X X X
Smart card X X X X X X
Fuzzy extractor technique [210] X X
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [171] X X
Key agreement X X X
Biohashing [211] X
Access polynomial [212] X
Elliptic curve cryptography [213] X X
Table 16: The smart card-based authentication protocols
Protocol Type Design goal
Das (2016) [75] Remote authentication - Providing a user authentication to resolve the security weaknesses of the scheme [214].
Chang et al. (2016) [76] Remote authentication - Providing mutual authentication and perfect forward secrecy.
Jiang et al. (2016) [77] Remote authentication - Providing mutual authentication, anonymity, and untraceability.
Farash et al. (2016) [78] Remote authentication - Providing the user authentication with traceability protection and sensor node anonymity.
Srinivas et al. (2017) [81] Remote authentication - Providing the mutual authentication with anonymity and unlinkability.
sharing technique [185] where the user can generate one-time pseudonym private key pairs and leakage-resilient locally. Similar
to the protocol [66], the protocol [69] uses the idea of digital signatures [188]. The protocol [51] uses keyed-hashing for message
authentication (HMAC) [190] to instantiate the pseudorandom function in the prototype implementation of electric vehicle
ecosystem. The protocol [55] uses two similar ideas, namely, identity-based public key cryptosystem [186] and identity-based
aggregate signature [187]. For providing a flexible attribute management, the protocol [57] uses an anonymous attribute-based
group setup scheme [189] that incorporates the policy-based data access control in the ciphertext.
As presented in Tab. 14, the protocol [31] uses two types of verification, namely, Heavy signing light verification (HSLV)
and Light signing heavy verification (LSHV), which is based on the HORS scheme [191]. The HSLV uses the follow-
ing three algorithms: Key Generation, Signing, and Verification. The Key Generation algorithm outputs the public key
PK = (k, v1, v2, . . . , vt) and the secret key SK = (k, s1, s2, . . . , st) where the trusted authority generates t random l-bit
strings s1, s2, . . . , st. The signature is (c, ( si1, si2, . . . , sk)) generated by the Signing algorithm. To verify a signature
(c′, ( s′i1, s′i2, . . . , s′k)) over message m, the user check if he output integers i1 > i2 > ik and f (s′j) = vij hold. On the other
hand, with LSHV, the signature verification process verifies the k elements of a signature by applying the one-way function
for a distinct number of times over each element. Similar to the protocol [67], the protocol [52] uses the same idea of Merkle
Hash tree technique [192]. In order to increase the level of security, the protocol [150] uses three cryptosystems, namely, short
signatures (BLS) [193], batch verification [194], signature aggregation [195]. The BLS is introduced by Boneh-Lynn-Shacham
[193], which is based on Gap Diffie–Hellman groups. Specifically, the BLS scheme uses the following three algorithms: 1)
Key generation algorithm to output the public key v ∈ G2 and the private key x , where x ← Zp and v ← g2x; 2) Signing
algorithm to generate a signature σ ∈ G1, where σ ← hx and h ← H(M) ∈ G1; and 3) Verification algorithm to verify
that (g2, v, h, σ) is a valid co-Diffie–Hellman tuple. The author of short signatures (BLS) [193], i.e., Dan Boneh, proposes
the idea of signature aggregation [195], where an aggregate signature is valid only if it is an aggregation of signatures on
distinct messages. Similar to the protocol [42], the protocol [151] uses the same cryptosystem, i.e., Identity-based Public
Key Cryptosystem [186]. Therefore, both protocols [152] and [58] use the two same cryptosystems, namely, 1) the public-key
encryption, such as RSA [196], and 2) HMAC, such as SHA-1 [197] and MD5 [198]. The protocol [153] uses the Diffie-Hellman
key establishment protocol [199] in order to provide forward secrecy in Transport Layer Security’s ephemeral modes. The
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protocol [154] uses the EIBC mechanism [200], which is based on the original model developed by D. Boneh and M. Franklin.
In addition, the protocol [58] uses the Homomorphic Encryption [202] and the Bloom Filter [203]. The protocol [70] uses two
cryptosystems, 1) HMAC, such as SHA-1 [197] and MD5 [198], 2) a symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm [199].
As presented in Tab.15, the protocol [71] uses two countermeasures, namely, Chebyshev Chaotic Maps [207] and Semigroup
Property of Chebyshev Polynomials [208]. The Chebyshev Polynomial of degree p is defined by Mason and Handscomb [208]
as Tp (x) = cos(p X acrcos x) where the domain is the interval x ∈ [−1, 1] with two properties [215]. However, three protocols,
i.e., [72], [73], and [74] use the ID-based cryptography (IBC) [201]. On the other hand, the protocol [155] uses the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [209] such as the protocol [56]. The smart card-based authentication protocols is a very promising
and practical solution to remote authentication [216], as presented in Tab. 16. There are five [75, 76, 77, 78, 81] smart card-
based authentication protocols where each protocol integrates a method with the smart card. For example, the protocol
[75] uses the fuzzy extractor technique [210], which a fuzzy extractor is a pair of randomized procedures, “generate” (Gen)
and “reproduce” (Rep), and is efficient if Gen and Rep run in expected polynomial time. For more details about the fuzzy
extractor technique, we refer the reader to the paper [210]. In addition, the elliptic curve cryptography [213] is used by both
protocols [80] and [157].
Figure 7: Formal security verification techniques
4.2. Formal security verification techniques
In order to prove the performance of an authentication protocol in terms of security, researchers use formal security
verification techniques. As presented in Fig. 7, there are five formal security verification techniques, namely, BAN-logic,
analysis by process (Spi calculus), Game Theory, Automated reasoning (ProVerif), and Automated Validation (AVISPA). In
addition, Tab. 17 presents the formal security verification techniques used in authentication protocols for the IoT.
The Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic (BAN-logic) [221] is used by nine authentication protocols [71, 72, 73, 77, 78, 81,
79, 80, 158]. A typical BAN logic sequence includes three steps, 1) Verification of message origin; 2) Verification of message
freshness; and 3) Verification of the origin’s trustworthiness. Therefore, the protocol [71] uses the BAN-logic to prove that the
proposed protocol can establish a session key between user and sensor node. Both protocols [72] and [80] use the BAN-logic
in order to prove that the protocol has achieved mutual authentication and session key agreement securely. The protocol
[81] uses the BAN-logic to prove that the protocol can resist numerous security attacks, which include the attacks, found
in the Amin and Biswas’s scheme [73]. There are seven authentication protocols [154, 73, 75, 78, 81, 158, 223] that use the
Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Application (AVISPA) security analyzer [220]. The AVISPA tool
provides a modular and expressive formal language for specifying security protocols and properties. The protocol [223] uses
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Table 17: Formal security verification techniques used in Authentication protocols for the IoT
Protocol Approach Main results
Lai et al. (2013)
[41]
- The security of the protocol is analyzed using the ProVerif tool [217] - Proof the mutual authentication between mobile equipment and its serv-
ing network.
Shao et al. (2016)
[66]
- Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption;
- Decision Linear (DLIN) Assumption;
- Extended Computational Diffie-Hellman (eCDH) Assumption
- Computational Inverse Diffie-Hellman (ciCDH) Assumption
- The proposed group signature scheme satisfies unforgeability;
The proposed group signature scheme satisfies anonymity;
- The proposed theorem satisfies the traceability.
Zhang et al. (2016)
[68]
- Based on the size of the beacon interval and the network bandwidth. - Broadcasting the MAC of a message’s prediction outcome is secure.
Zhang et al. (2015)
[55]
- Bilinear Diffie-Hellman and the computational Diffie- Hellman assump-
tions
- The protocol satisfies individual authentication, non-repudiation, vehi-
cle privacy and traceability.
Dolev et al. (2016)
[69]
- Spi calculus [218] - The proposed session key establishment protocol respects the authen-
ticity property and the secrecy property.
Chan et al. (2014)
[51]
- NXP-ATOP platform [219] - Demonstrate the two-factor cyber-physical device authentication
Lai et al. (2013)
[40]
- The security of the protocol is analyzed using the ProVerif tool [217] - The scheme can implement mutual authentication and key agreement
between multiple devices and the core network simultaneously.
Li et al. (2011) [31] - Prove the existence of a pivot rank by contradiction. - The total signing cost does not increase.
Li et al. (2012)
[150]
- Diagnose tools - Detect failure points and to minimize the whole fault time.
Nicanfar et al.
(2014) [154]
- Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [220]
- Providing mutual authentication and key management mechanisms.
Mahmood et al.
(2016) [70]
- The security of the protocol is analyzed using the ProVerif tool [217] - Verifies mutual authentication and session key secrecy properties of the
proposed scheme.
Kumari et al.
(2016) [71]
- Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic (BAN-logic) [221]. - Prove that the proposed scheme establish a session key between user
and sensor node
Chung et al. (2016)
[72]
- Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic (BAN-logic) [221]. - Prove the validity of authentication and key agreement protocol.
Amin et al. (2016)
[73]
- Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic (BAN-logic) [221].
- Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [220].
- Prove that the protocol has achieved mutual authentication and session
key agreement securely.
Das (2016) [75] - Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [220].
- The scheme is secure against the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks
against an adversary.
Chang et al. (2016)
[76]
- Sequence of games under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (ECDDH) prob-
lem.
- The scheme provides secure and perfect forward secrecy authentication.
Jiang et al. (2016)
[77]
- Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic (BAN-logic) [221]. - The improved scheme accomplishes mutual authentication and key
agreement between the user and sensor, the user and the gateway node.
Farash et al.
(2016) [78]
- Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic (BAN-logic) [221].
- Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [220].
- Prove that the scheme allows a user to establish a session key with a
sensor node of his choice near the end of the authentication process.
Srinivas et al.
(2017) [81]
- Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic (BAN-logic) [221].
- Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [220].
- The scheme can resist numerous security attacks, which include the
attacks, found in the Amin and Biswas’s scheme [73].
Kumari et al.
(2016) [79]
- Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic (BAN-logic) [221]. - The scheme provides secure mutual authentication between a legal user
and an accessed sensor node inside WSN or not.
Jiang et al. (2016)
[80]
- Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic (BAN-logic) [221]. - Prove that an identity and a session key is agreed between the user and
the sensor
Wu et al. (2016)
[157]
- The security of the protocol is analyzed using the ProVerif tool [217] - The scheme passes the verifications according to the Dolev-Yao model
[222].
Das et al. (2016)
[158]
- Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic (BAN-logic) [221].
- Random oracle model.
- Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [220].
- Prove secure mutual authentication between a legal user and an accessed
sensor node.
Das et al. (2016)
[223]
- Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [220].
- The scheme is free from man-in-the-middle and replay attacks.
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the AVISPA tool in order to prove that the proposed protocol is free from man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. The protocol
[78] uses the AVISPA tool to prove that the protocol allows a user to establish a session key with a sensor node of his choice
near the end of the authentication process. In addition, there are four authentication protocols [41, 40, 70, 157] that use
the ProVerif tool [217], which is an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier, in the formal model, called Dolev-Yao model
[222]. The protocol [41] uses the ProVerif tool in order to proof the mutual authentication between the mobile equipment
and its serving network. The protocol [40] uses the ProVerif tool to prove that the proposed protocol can implement mutual
authentication and key agreement between multiple devices and the core network simultaneously. The protocol [157] uses the
ProVerif tool prove that the proposed protocol can pass the verifications according to the Dolev-Yao model [222]. Finally,
the protocol [76] uses a sequence of games under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (ECDDH) problem in order to proof that the
protocol provides secure and perfect forward secrecy authentication. For more details about the game-theoretic approaches,
we refer the reader to the survey [224].
Figure 8: The realization processes of an authentication protocol for the IoT
5. Taxonomy and comparison of authentication protocols for the IoT
In this section, we in-detail examine authentication protocols developed for or applied in the context of IoT. The detailed
comparison of computational cost and communication overhead of authentication protocols for the IoT and the notations used
are given in Tab. 19 and 18, respectively. As shown in Fig. 8, the realization processes of an authentication protocol for IoT
are based on the following processes:
1. Definition of network model (e.g., M2M, IoV, IoE, IoS...etc.).
2. Definition of authentication model (e.g., mutual authentication, perfect forward secrecy, anonymity, untraceability...etc.).
3. Definition of attacks model (e.g., replay attack, stolen smart card attack, privileged-insider attack, offline password
guessing attack, impersonation attack, and sensor node capture attack....etc.).
4. Selection of countermeasures (e.g., cryptographic methods, bloom Filter, biometric, Smart card, access polynomial,
Chebyshev Chaotic Maps . . . etc.).
5. Proposition of main phases of the protocol (e.g., initial setup; registration process...etc.).
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Table 18: Notations used in comparison of computational cost and communication overhead
Notations
n: represents the number of machine-type communications (MTC) devices in a group;
m : represents the number of groups;
T EAP : The latency for the full Extensible Authentication Protocol authentication;
Tw : The transmission latency between the Mobile Station and Base Station;
Tc: The transmission latency between any two relatively close devices;
Ta: The transmission latency between the Base Station and infrastructures;
Tmul: The time for a point multiplication operation;
Ts: The time for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation;
TMAC : The time for a HMAC operation;
Tpair : The time for a bilinear pairing operation;
TD : The time for a Dot16KDF operation;
Thash: The time for a hash operation;
Tmtp: The time for a map to point hash operation;
Ehandshake: The energy consumption in audio handshake phase;
Eaudiorec: The energy consumption during Sound(AuthA) reception;
Efeature: The energy consumption during the fingerprint extraction phase;
EMA: The energy consumption during the fingerprint matching phase;
Eaudiogen: The energy consumption during the audio signals Sound(AuthA) generation;
Eaudiotran: The energy consumption during the audio signals Sound(AuthA) transmission;
Edete: The energy consumption in the active attack detection algorithm;
M : Message length(bit);
α: The transmission cost of an authentication message between the mobile subscribers and the visiting authentication server;
β: The transmission cost of an authentication message between the visiting authentication server and the home authentication center;
Te: The computation costs of an exponentiation operation in G1;
Tenc: The time of symmetric key encryption operations;
BFMAGs list: The transmitted bytes of Mobile Access Gateway;
BCHL/RESP : The transmitted bytes of the challenge/response messages during handovers;
Tdisclose: The require time for disclose;
BACK : The transmitted bytes of Ack messages;
Bdisclose: The transmitted bytes of disclose;
TEAP : The require time for the Extensible Authentication Protocol;
BEAP : The transmitted bytes for the Extensible Authentication Protocol;
Bkey−exchange: The transmitted bytes of key exchange phase;
Tver : The require time for verifying signatures;
Tsing : The require time for signing;
BCert: The transmitted bytes of a certificate;
Nrev : The total number of revoked certificates in a certificate revocation list;
te,G1
: The timings for one exponentiation in G1;
te,G2
: The timings for one exponentiation in G2;
TASED : The time for asymmetric encryption/decryption;
TSED : The time for symmetric encryption/decryption;
THMAC : The time for HMAC;
TChaotic: The time complexity for computing Chebyshev chaotic map operation;
TECP : The time complexity for computing elliptic curve point multiplication;
Tmod:The execution time of a modular exponential operation;
Tfuzzy : The time for the fuzzy extractor operation;
TXOR: The time for performing an XOR operation;
6. Security analyses using formal security verification (e.g., ProVerif, BAN-logic, AVISPA. . . etc).
7. Performance evaluation (e.g., in terms of storage cost, computation complexity, communication overhead, lower error
rates. . . etc.).
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Table 19: Comparison of computational cost and communication overhead
Protocol Computation complexity Communication overhead
Lai et al. [64] GLARM-1: (4Thash)n + 3Thash
GLARM-2 : (4Thash)n + 3Thash
N/A
Cao et al. [35] nTmtp + (2n + 1)Tmul + 2Tpair 2n + 6m
Lai et al. [40] (3 + 2n)Thash 6m
EPS [225] (5Thash)n 8n
EAP-AKA (5Thash)n N/A
Zhang et al. [14] (4Thash)n N/A
Huang et al. [28] (6Thash)n N/A
Chen et al. [36] (3Thash)n + (2Thash)m N/A
Chen et al. [65] 2Ehandshake+2Eaudiorec+Efeature+EMA+Eaudiogen+
Eaudiotran + Edete
N/A
Lai et al. [49] nTmtp + (2n + 1)Tmul + 2Tpair N/A
Lai et al. [41] (3Thash + 2Tmul)n + (2Thash)m N/A
Fu et al. [37] 2TMAC + TD + 2Tmul 2Tc/n + 4Tw
Huang et al. [226] 2Ts + 2TMAC + TD 2Tc + 5Tw
Zhang et al. [18] 2Ts + 2TMAC + 2Tpair + 3Tmul 2Tc + 5Tw
Lai et al. [50] 25.25Te + 10Tpair 3α
Yang et al. [20] 8.75Te + 3Tpair 3α
He et al. [29] 15.75Te + 4Tpair 3α
Kim et al. [17] N/A 3α
Jiang et al. [15] N/A 3α + 2β
Shi et al. [227] N/A 4α + 2β
Cspedes et al. [42] 2Tenc BFMAGs list + BCHL/RESP
Xie et al. [16] Tenc+Tver+Tsing BCert
Ristanovic et al. [30] Tsing + Tver BCert
Wasef et al. [43] O(Nrev) The revocation check=0.42 µsec
Shao et al. [66] 15te,G1
+ 5te,G2
+ 13tpair N/A
Lyu et al. [67] N/A N/A
Al Shidhani [21] Tenc + TEAP BEAP + Bkey−exchange
Zhang et al. [68] N/A N/A
Heer et al. [19] Tenc+Tdisclose BACK + Bdisclose
Zhang et al. [55] N/A N/A
Dolev et al. [69] Direct iteration cost = 2 rounds N/A
Krawczyk [228] Direct iteration cost = 3 rounds N/A
Chan et al. [51] N/A N/A
Sun et al. [56] (4Thash)n User to M2M server : M = 384
M2M server to User : M = 160
Lai et al. [57]
(
4Thash
)
n + (7n + 5)Tmul N/A
Li et al. [31] Signing & verification cost =µ +
k(k+1)
2
+ 1 Signing size (bit)= kl + logµ
Perrig [229] Signing & verification cost = 2t + 2k + 1 Signing size (bit)= kl
Li et al. [52] With the number of HAN users = 4000, the computation cost =
0.36 ms
896 bits
IEEE 802.16m [32] 3Ts + 6TMAC + TD T EAP + Ta + 5Tw
Chim et al. [58] 38.2n + 1390.8 msec N/A
Mahmood et al. [70] 6TASED + 4TSED + 2Thash + 2THMAC 800 bytes
Fouda et al. [33] 9TASED + 2Thash 1040 bytes
Sule et al. [38] 9TASED + 2Thash + 2THMAC 1040 bytes
Kumari et al. [71] 13Thash + 4TChaotic + 4TSED 1408 bits
Xue et al. [44] 22Thash 2432 bits
Li et al. [45] 28Thash 2432 bits
Li et al. [59] 18Thash + 10TSED 1152 bits
He et al. [60] 23Thash 1920 bits
Choi et al. [53] 6TECP + 20Thash 2944 bits
Chung et al. [72] 28Thash N/A
Jiang et al. [46] 15Thash + 2Tmod N/A
Wen et al. [47] 15Thash + 4Tmod N/A
Shin et al. [61] 14Thash + 4TSED + 2Tmod N/A
Gope et al. [62] 18Thash + 2TSED + 2Tmod N/A
Farash et al. [63] 23Thash + 4TSED N/A
Amin et al. [73] 20Thash 1280/1680 bits
Turkanovi et al. [54] 19Thash 768 bits
Das et al. [39] 10Thash + 4TSED 384 bits
Turkanovi and Hlbl [48] 7Thash + 5TSED 384 bits
Yeh et al. [34] 8Thash + 8TSED 384 bits
Chen and Shih [22] 10Thash 384 bits
Fan et al. [23] 19Thash 640 bits
Vaidya et al. [24] 13Thash 384bits
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He et al. [25] 11Thash 384 bits
Huang et al. [26] 11Thash 384 bits
Gope et al. [74] 19Thash 35 bytes
Das [75] 31Thash + 2Tfuzzy 4 messages (1952 bits)
Chang et al. [76] 20Thash + 9TXOR N/A
Khan and Alghathbar
[27]
12Thash 384 bits
Jiang et al. [77] 23Thash + 3TECP N/A
Farash et al. [78] 32Thash User - Sensor node = 79 bytes
Sensor node - Gateway node = 158 bytes
Gateway node - Sensor node = 99 bytes
Sensor node - User = 98 bytes
Srinivas et al. [81] Case-1: 29Thash
Case-2: 35Thash
Case-1 = 4 messages (353 bytes)
Case-2 = 7 messages (547 bytes)
Kumari et al. [79] 44Thash 58 bytes
Jiang et al. [80] 17Thash + 6TECP N/A
Table 20: Summary of authentication protocols for M2M (Published between 2012 and 2016)
Protocol Network model Goals Main processes Performances (+) and limitations (-)
Lai et al.
(2016) [64]
- Based on 3GPP stan-
dard with three do-
mains, including, ac-
cess networks, evolved
packet core, and non-
3GPP domain, e.g., In-
ternet.
- Guarantee the en-
tity mutual authenti-
cation and secure key
agreement.
- Initialization phase;
- Group authentication
and key agreement
phase.
+ Resistance to DoS attack, redirection attack, and man-in-the-middle
attack.
+ Computation overheads are fairly small.
+ Computation complexity is much less than schemes [35] [49] and [41].
+ Can ensure QoS for machine-type communications devices.
- Some privacy models are not analyzed such as location privacy and
identity privacy.
- Storage costs is not considered.
Chen et al.
(2016) [65]
- Two wireless devices. - Achieving variable
distance authentica-
tion and active attack
detection.
- Audio-handshake
phase;
- Mixed-signal genera-
tion phase;
- Feature extraction and
storage phase.
+ Efficient in terms of lower error rates compared with DISWN [230],
LDTLS [231], PLTEA [232], and SeArray [233].
+ Active attack detection (e.g., audio replay attack).
- Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme
[64].
- Storage costs is not considered.
Lai et al.
(2014) [49]
- 3GPP-WiMAX-
Machine-type Commu-
nication.
- Achieving mutual
authentication and key
agreement between all
Machine-type Commu-
nication devices.
- Initialization phase
- Roaming phase
+ Efficient in terms of the communication overhead compared to the
traditional roaming authentication scheme and the optimized roaming
authentication scheme in [37].
+ Efficient in terms of computation complexity compared to the scheme
without aggregation.
- Resistance to attacks is not studied.
- Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme
[64].
- Storage costs is not considered.
Lai et al.
(2013) [41]
- 3GPP standard with
three domains, namely
access network domain,
serving network domain
and home network do-
main.
- Guarantee privacy-
preservation and key
forward/backward
secrecy with.
- Preparation and ini-
tialization;
- Protocol execution for
the first equipment;
- Protocol execution for
the remaining equip-
ment of the same group;
- Group member join-
ing/leaving the group.
+ Considers the data integrity and ensure user privacy.
+ Resistance to attacks (DoS attack, redirection attack, man-in-the-
middle attack, and replay attack)
+ The overhead of authentication message delivery of SE-AKA is lower
than other existing AKA protocols.
+ The computational overhead is larger than that of other traditional
protocols such as the work [234].
+ Smaller storage costs than others protocols
- Some privacy models are not analyzed such as location privacy and
identity privacy.
Fu et al.
(2012) [37]
- Mobile WiMAX net-
works with an access
service network
- Achieving mutual au-
thentication and privacy
preservation, and resist-
ing the domino effect.
- Pre-deployment phase;
- Initial authentication
phase;
- Handover authentica-
tion phase.
+ Efficient in terms of the computational and communication overhead
compared to three schemes [235] [236] [42].
+ Considers the privacy preservation.
- Storage costs is not considered.
- Resistance to attacks is not studied.
- No threat model presented.
- Error-detection and fault tolerance
are not considered.
Sun et al.
(2015) [56]
- Mobile users, home
gateways, and an M2M
server.
- Achieving a mutual
authentication process
in machine-to machine
home network service.
- Set-up;
- Registration phase;
- Login and authentica-
tion phase;
- Update password
phase;
- Home gateway joins
the Time Division-
Synchronous Code
Division Multiple Ac-
cess network.
+ Efficient in terms of the amount of calculation and communication vol-
ume compared to the protocol in [237].
+ Resistance to guessing attack, stolen-verifier attack, impersonation at-
tack, and replay attack.
- Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme
[64].
- Storage costs is not considered.
- Lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67].
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Lai et al.
(2014) [50]
- Roaming network
architecture with the
home authentication
center (HAC), the
trust linking server
(TLS), and the visiting
authentication server
(VAS).
- Providing a strong
anonymous access au-
thentication.
- Guarantee user track-
ing on a disputed access
request.
- Achieving anonymous
user linking and effi-
cient user revocation for
dynamic membership.
- System initialization;
- Roaming;
- User tracking algo-
rithm;
- Anonymous user link-
ing;
- User revocation.
+ Efficient in terms of communication overhead and computation cost
compared to two strong anonymous schemes [20] and [29].
+ Considers the data integrity and ensure user privacy.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, Denial of Service (DoS) attack and im-
personation attack.
- Some privacy models are not analyzed such as location privacy.
- Lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67].
Zhu et al.
(2015) [149]
- Android smartphone
devices.
- Satisfy the user-
friendly with a reason-
able false rejection rate.
- Achieving an authen-
tication process for
Android smartphone
devices.
- Feature-set extraction
and storing for registra-
tion;
- Dual-factor authenti-
cation.
+ Can enhance user-friendliness.
+ Improve security without adding extra hardware devices.
- No threat model presented.
Lai et al.
(2013) [40]
- Based on 3GPP
standard with three
domains: (1) Evolved
universal terrestrial
radio access network (E
UTRAN), (2) Evolved
Packet Core (EPC),
(3) Non-3GPP domain,
e.g., Internet.
- Guarantee the en-
tity mutual authenti-
cation and secure key
agreement.
- Initialization phase;
- Group authentication
and key agreement
phase.
+ Efficient in terms of the signaling and computation overhead compared
to the schemes [35] [225].
+ Resistance to attacks, i.e., replay attack, redirection attack, and man-
in-the-middle attack.
+ Considers the data integrity.
- Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme
[64].
- Storage costs is not considered.
- Lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67].
Table 21: Summary of authentication protocols for IoE (Published between 2011 and 2016)
Protocol Network model Goals Main processes Performances (+) and limitations (-)
Li et al.
(2011)
[31]
- Smart Grid with wide
multicast applications,
namely, wide area
protection, demand-
response, operation
and control, and in-
substation protection.
- Provide multicast au-
thentication.
- Key generation;
- Signing;
- Verification.
+ Efficient in terms of hash or one-way function invocations compared
to the scheme [238].
+ Resistance to message forgery attacks.
+ Can reduces the storage cost.
- Privacy-preserving is not discussed.
- The reports’ confidentiality and integrity are not considered compared
to the scheme [52].
Li et al.
(2014) [52]
- Communication be-
tween the home area
networks (HANs) and
the neighborhood gate-
way using WiFi technol-
ogy.
- Detecting the replay
attacks;
- Providing authentica-
tion for the source of
electricity consumption
reports;
- Guarantees the re-
ports’ confidentiality
and integrity.
- System initialization;
- Report generation;
- Neighborhood gateway
authentication.
+ Efficient in terms of computation complexity of the HAN user and
the neighborhood gateway compared to the RSA-based authentication
scheme.
+ Efficient in terms of communication overhead between the HAN user
and the neighborhood gateway compared to the RSA-based authentica-
tion scheme.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay attack, message injection attack,
message analysis attack, and message modification attack.
+ Guarantees the reports’ confidentiality and integrity compared to the
scheme [31].
- The routing attacks are not considered such as wormhole attack.
Li et al.
(2012) [150]
- The smart grid with
power generation, power
transmission, and power
distribution.
- Providing the authen-
tication for power us-
age data aggregation in
Neighborhood Area Net-
work (NAN) with fault
tolerance architecture.
- Key generation;
- Signature generation;
- Batch verification and
trinary diagnose Tree-
Batch;
- Signature amortiza-
tion for Package Blocks;
+ Makes significant performance gains in terms of the communication
and computation cost.
+ Considers the fault diagnosis.
- No threat model presented.
Nicanfar et
al. (2011)
[151]
- The data communica-
tion in outside of the
Home Area Network
(HAN).
- Some smart meters
and a utility server
under a wireless mesh
network topology.
- Communication in-
side a home domain is
IEEE 802.15.4 based,
and outside is WiMax
(IEEE 802.16).
- All node have an IP
address (most likely
IPv6).
Providing mutual au-
thentication scheme
to prevent brute-force
attacks, replay attacks,
Man-In-The-Middle
(MITM) attack, and
Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks.
- Initialization;
- Ongoing maintenance
or Short period key
refreshment;
- Long period key re-
freshment;
- Multicast key support.
+ Can provide simplicity and low overhead.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, brute-force attacks, replay attacks,
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack, and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.
+ Can provide secure key management.
- The reports’ confidentiality and integrity are considered compared to
the scheme [52].
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Chim et al.
(2011) [152]
- Smart grid network
with three basic layers,
namely, power genera-
tors, substations, and
smart meters and smart
appliances.
- Guarantee the message
authentication, identity
privacy, and traceabil-
ity.
- Preparation module;
- Pseudo-identity gener-
ation module;
- Signing module;
- Verification module;
- Tracing module.
+ Requires only an additional 368 msec for HMAC signature verification
at a substation.
+ Efficient in overall normal traffic success rate when under attack.
+ The message overhead is only 20 bytes per request message.
- The routing attacks are not considered such as wormhole attack.
- Storage costs is not considered.
- No comparison with other schemes.
Fouda et al.
(2011) [153]
- Smart grid with the
power Distribution
Network (DN), the
Transmission Substa-
tion (TS), and a number
of Distribution Substa-
tions (DSs).
- The communication
framework for the lower
distribution network
split into NAN, BAN,
and HAN.
- Providing mutual au-
thentication and achieve
message authentication
in a light-weight way.
- Key generation;
- Message generation;
- Hash-based message
authentication.
+ Efficient in terms of communication overhead and message decryp-
tion/verification delay compared to ECDSA-256.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay attack, chosen-plaintext attack,
and collision attack.
- Location privacy is not considered.
- Identity privacy and traceability are not considered compared to the
scheme [152].
Nicanfar et
al. (2014)
[154]
- Multigate communica-
tion network proposed
in ref. [239]
- Providing mutual
authentication and key
management mecha-
nisms.
- SGMA scheme (System
setup; Mutual authenti-
cation Scheme)
- SGKM protocol (Key
refreshment; Multicast
key mechanism; Broad-
cast key mechanism)
+ Can prevent the adversary from continuing the successful attack.
+ Can prevent various attacks while reducing the management overhead.
- Storage costs is not considered.
- Lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67].
Chim et al.
(2015) [58]
- Smart grid network
based on hierarchical ar-
chitecture, i.e., HANs,
BANs, NANs.
- Providing the privacy-
preserving recording
and gateway-assisted
authentication.
- Preparation phase;
- Power plan submission
phase;
- Power plan processing
phase;
- Reconciliation phase;
- System master secret
updating phase.
+ The message filtering at gateway smart meters can helpful in reducing
the impact of attacking traffic.
+ The privacy-preserving and traceability is considered.
- No comparison with other schemes.
- Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks is not considered.
Mahmood
et al.
(2016) [70]
- The system model
is homogeneous to the
model in ref. [52].
- Detect and omit some
attacks, namely, replay,
false message injection,
message analysis and
modification attacks.
- Initialization;
- Authentication;
- Message transmission.
+ Efficient in terms of communication cost and computation cost
compared to the schemes [33] [38].
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay, false message injection, message
analysis and modification attacks.
+ The reports’ confidentiality and integrity are considered.
- Location privacy is not considered.
5.1. Authentication protocols for M2M
The surveyed papers of authentication protocols for Machine to machine communications (M2M) as shown in Tab. 20
are published between 2012 and 2016. In order to speed up the process of authentication and avoid authentication signaling
overload, Lai et al. [64] focused on the problem of group authentication and key agreement for resource-constrained M2M
devices in 3GPP networks. Specifically, the authors proposed a novel group-based lightweight authentication scheme for
resource constrained M2M, called GLARM. The network model used in [64] is based on 3GPP standard with three domains,
including, access networks, evolved packet core, and non-3GPP domain, e.g., Internet. To guarantee the entity mutual
authentication and secure key agreement, the GLARM scheme uses two main phases, namely, 1) Initialization phase and 2)
Group authentication and key agreement phase. In addition, the GLARM scheme can not only ensure QoS for machine-type
communications devices, but the computation complexity is much less than schemes [35],[49] and [41]. In order to distinguish
between different physical devices running the same software and detecting mimic attacks, Chen et al. [65] proposed an
authentication protocol for the IoT, named S2M. The S2M protocol uses tree main phases, namely, 1) audio-handshake
phase, 2) mixed-signal generation phase, and 3) feature extraction and storage phase. S2M can achieve variable distance
authentication and active attack detection using acoustic hardware (Speaker/Microphone) fingerprints. In addition, S2M is
efficient in terms of lower error rates compared with DISWN [230], LDTLS [231], PLTEA [232], and SeArray [233], but the
performance of the methods in terms of privacy preservation is not analyzed, especially in comparison to the GLARM scheme
[64].
To authenticate a group of devices at the same time, Lai et al. [49] proposed a scheme named, SEGR. Based on roaming
phase, SEGR can achieving mutual authentication and key agreement between all Machine-type Communication (MTC)
25
devices when a group of MTC devices roams between 3GPP and WiMAX networks. SEGR is efficient in terms of the
communication overhead computation complexity compared to the scheme in [37] and the scheme without aggregation, but
again a comparison with other methods such as the GLARM scheme [64] regarding privacy preservation is missing. We also
note that resistance to attacks of the SEGR method is not studied in the article as well [49]. To guarantee privacy-preservation
and key forward/backward secrecy, Lai et al. [41] proposed an efficient group authentication and key agreement protocol,
called SE-AKA, which is based on authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol. The overhead of authentication
message delivery of SE-AKA is lower than other existing AKA protocols, but the computational overhead is larger than
that of other traditional protocols such as the work [234]. In addition, SE-AKA has smaller storage costs than others AKA
protocols. Similar to the SE-AKA protocol, Lai et al. in [40] proposed a lightweight group authentication protocol for M2M,
called LGTH, which is efficient in terms of the signaling and computation overhead compared to the schemes [35] and [225].
Similar to the SE-AKA & LGTH protocols, Fu et al. [37] proposed a group-based handover authentication scheme for mobile
WiMAX networks. Based on the handover authentication phase, the work [37] is efficient in terms of the computational and
communication overhead compared to three schemes [235],[236], and [234], but the resistance to attacks is not studied and no
threat model is presented.
In order to achieve a mutual authentication process in machine-to-machine home network service, Sun et al. [56] proposed
an M2M application model for remote access to the intelligence home network service using the existing Time Division-
Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA) system. The protocol [56] is efficient in terms of the amount
of calculations needed and communication volume compared to the protocol in [237], but the article lacks a comparison of
performance in terms of non-repudiation against other schemes such as the PBA [67]. To achieve the authentication of mo-
bile subscribers in the roaming service, Lai et al. [50] proposed a conditional privacy-preserving authentication with access
linkability, called CPAL. The CPAL can 1) provide a strong anonymous access authentication, 2) guarantee user tracking on
a disputed access request, and 3) achieve anonymous user linking and efficient user revocation for dynamic membership. The
CPAL is efficient in terms of communication overhead and computation cost compared to two strong anonymous schemes
[20] and [29], but privacy aspects are not analyzed such as location privacy. Without adding any extra hardware devices,
Zhu et al. [149] proposed a dual-factor authentication scheme, called Duth, designed for Android smartphone devices. Based
on two main processes, namely, 1) feature-set extraction and storing for registration, 2) dual-factor authentication, the Duth
scheme can satisfy the user-friendly requirements, along with a reasonable false rejection rate, providing on the same time an
authentication process for Android smartphone devices.
Table 22: Summary of authentication protocols for (IoV) (Published between 2013 and 2016)
Protocol Network model Goals Main processes Performances (+) and limitations (-)
Cspedes et
al. (2013)
[42]
- A vehicular com-
munications network
with Access Routers
(ARs) that connect the
VANET to external IP
networks
- Achieving mutual au-
thentication against au-
thentication attacks
- Key establishment
phase;
- MR registration phase;
- Authentication phase;
- Mobile router revoca-
tion.
+ Considers the asymmetric links in the VANET.
+ Achieving less location update cost compared with the scheme [240].
+ The handover delay lower than the one in the scheme [240].
+ Resistance to replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and denial of
service (DoS) attack.
- Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme
[64].
- Lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67].
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Wasef et al.
(2013) [43]
- VANET with a trusted
authority and some enti-
ties including On-Board
Units (OBUs), and in-
frastructure Road-Side
Units (RSUs).
- Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V) and Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I)
communications
- Expedite message au-
thentication
- System initialization;
- Message authentica-
tion;
- Revocation.
+ Efficient in terms of computational complexity of revocation status
checking.
+ The authentication delay is constant and independent of the number
of revoked certificates.
+ Efficient in terms of communication overhead.
+ Resistance to forging attack, replay attack, and colluding attack.
- Storage costs is not considered.
- No comparison with other schemes.
- Lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67].
Shao et al.
(2016) [66]
- VANET with some
parties, including, cen-
tral authority, tracing
manager, many RSUs,
and many OBUs.
- Guarantee unforge-
ability, anonymity, and
traceability.
Initialization stage;
Registration stage;
Join stage;
Sign stage;
Verify stage;
Trace stage.
+ Efficient in terms of the computational cost of three operations,
namely, Initialization, Registration, and Trace.
+ Can prevent replay attacks.
- No comparison with other schemes.
- The communication overhead is not studied.
- Lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67].
Lyu et al.
(2016) [67]
- VANET with divide
messages into two types
1) single-hop beacons
and 2) multi-hop traffic
data.
- Guarantee some prop-
erties such as timely
authentication, non-
repudiation, packet
losses resistant, and
DoS attacks resistant.
- Chained keys genera-
tion;
- Position prediction;
- Merkle hash tree con-
struction;
- Signature generation;
- Self-Generated MAC
Storage;
- Signature Verification.
+ Considers the non-repudiation.
+ The computational cost reduces with the increasing of time frame.
+ Can resist packet losses.
+ Maintain high packet processing rate with low storage overhead.
+ Efficient in terms of overall delay compared to the TESLA scheme in
[181] [182] [183] and the VAST scheme in [180].
- Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme
[64].
Zhang et al.
(2016) [68]
- Trusted authority
(TA), a number of RSUs
and vehicles
- Guarantee the con-
ditional unlinkability,
ideal tamper-proof de-
vice (TPD) freeness,
key escrow freeness.
- Member secrets gener-
ation;
- Vehicle sign;
- Message verification
and signature storage;
- Trace internal pseudo-
identity (IPID) and au-
thentication key update;
- On-Line update.
+ Efficient in terms of message authentication delay on average.
+ Considers privacy preserving.
+ Resistance to the side-channel attack, false messages attack, denial-of-
service (DoS) attack, and Sybil attack.
+ Efficient than the ECDSA protocol in [184] and more efficient than
the IBA scheme in [55] on average.
- Lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67].
Zhang et al.
(2015) [55]
- VANET with four
main entities, i.e., key
generator center (KGC),
traffic management au-
thority (TMA), RSUs
and vehicles.
- Guarantee some prop-
erties such as message
authentication, non-
repudiation, message
confidentiality, privacy,
and traceability.
- System setup;
- Protocol for STP and
STK distribution;
- Protocol for common
string synchronization;
- Protocol for vehicular
communications.
+ Efficient in terms of the average message delay and the verification
delay.
+ Efficient in terms of verification delay compared to the scheme in [187].
+ Considers the non-repudiation.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, message reply, message modification,
movement tracking.
- Location privacy is not considered.
Dolev et al.
(2016) [69]
- The vehicle network
is divided into the
controller area network
(CAN), local intercon-
nect network (LIN), and
media oriented system
(MOST).
- Ensure the coun-
termeasures against
the Man-in-the-Middle
attack under the vehicle
authentication.
- System settings;
- Certificate authority;
- Vehicular attributes.
+ Efficient in terms of iteration cost compared to the existing Authenti-
cated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols such as ISO-KE [241] and SIGMA
[228].
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, Man-in-the-Middle attack and imper-
sonation attack.
- Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme
[64].
Chan et al.
(2014) [51]
- Smart grid electric ve-
hicle ecosystem
- Provides assurance of
the digital identity and
the device’s controlla-
bility in the physical do-
main.
- Communication set-
tings;
- Cyber-physical device
authentication.
+ Resistance to substitution attacks.
- No comparison with other schemes.
- The average message delay and the verification delay are not evaluated.
Lai et al.
(2015) [57]
- The trust authority
(TA), road side units
(RSUs), and vehicles.
- Provide strong anony-
mous access authentica-
tion.
- System initialization;
- Platoon merging;
- Platoon splitting;
- Anonymous authenti-
cation with traceability.
+ Efficient in terms of computational cost.
- No comparison with other schemes.
- The average message delay and the verification delay are not evaluated.
- No threat model presented.
Table 23: Summary of authentication protocols for IoS (Published in 2016)
Protocol Network model Goals Main processes Performances (+) and limitations (-)
Kumari et
al. (2016)
[71]
- Wireless sensor net-
work (WSN) with the
service seeker users,
sensing component
sensor nodes (SNs) and
the service provider
base-station or gateway
node (GWN).
- Providing mutual
authentication with
forward secrecy and
wrong identifier detec-
tion mechanism at the
time of login.
- Initialization phase;
- User registration
phase;
- Login phase;
- Authentication & key
agreement phase;
- Password change
phase;
+ The user is anonymous.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, user impersonation attack, password
guessing attack, replay attack, stolen verifier attack, smart card loss at-
tack, session-specific temporary information attack, GWN Bypass attack,
and privileged insider attack.
+ Provides a secure session-key agreement and forward secrecy.
+ Provides freely password changing facility.
+ Efficient in unauthorized login detection with wrong identity and pass-
word.
- The data integrity is not considered.
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Chung et al.
(2016) [72]
- Wireless sensor net-
works for roaming ser-
vice.
- Providing an enhanced
lightweight anony-
mous authentication
to resolve the secu-
rity weaknesses of the
scheme [63].
- Registration phase;
- Login and authentica-
tion phase;
- Password change
phase.
+ Considers anonymity, hop-by-hop authentication, and untraceability.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, password guessing attack, imperson-
ation attack, forgery attack, known session key attack, and fair key agree-
ment.
- Location privacy is not considered.
Jan et al.
(2016) [155]
- A cluster-based hierar-
chical WSN.
- Providing an ex-
tremely lightweight
payload-based mutual
authentication
- Token-based cluster
head election;
- Payload-based mutual
authentication.
+ Considers authenticity, confidentiality, and freshness of data for node-
to-node communication.
+ Robustness against attacks, namely, replay attack, resource exhaustion
attack, and Sybil attack.
+ Efficient in terms of average energy consumption and Handshake du-
ration compared to the LEACH-C scheme in [242] and the SecLEACH
scheme [243].
- Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme
[64].
- Lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67].
- Storage costs is not considered.
Amin et al.
(2016) [73]
- Three types of entities
such as (a) sensor nodes,
(b) gateway nodes, and
(c) users.
- Providing a user au-
thentication and key
agreement protocol
to resolve the secu-
rity weaknesses of the
scheme [54].
- System setup phase;
- Sensor node registra-
tion phase;
- User registration
phase;
- Login phase;
- Authentication and
key agreement phase;
- Dynamic node addi-
tion phase;
- Password update
phase.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, password guessing attack, user imper-
sonation attack, gateway node impersonation attack, privileged insider
attack, replay attack, and session key computation attack.
+ Efficient in terms of computational cost compared to the schemes [54]
[44] [39] [48] [34].
+ Efficient in term of storage and communication cost compared to the
schemes [54] [44] [39] [48] [34].
- Lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67].
Gope et al.
(2016) [74]
- Real-time data access
in WSNs.
- Ensuring the user
anonymity, perfect
forward secrecy, and re-
siliency of stolen smart
card attacks.
- Registration phase;
- Anonymous authenti-
cation and key exchange
phase;
- Password renewal
phase;
- Dynamic node addi-
tion phase.
+ Considers the user anonymity and untraceability.
+ Provides perfect forward secrecy.
+ Security assurance in case of lost smart card.
+ Resilience against node capture attack and key compromise imperson-
ation Attack.
+ Efficient in terms of computational and communication cost compared
to the schemes [34], [44], [244], [214] and [75].
- The average message delay and the verification delay are not evaluated.
Das (2016)
[75]
- WSN - Providing a user au-
thentication to resolve
the security weaknesses
of the scheme [214].
- Pre-deployment of
sensor nodes phase;
- Registration phase;
- Login phase;
- Authentication and
key agreement phase;
- Password and biomet-
ric update phase;
- Dynamic node addi-
tion phase.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, privileged insider attack, offline/online
password and biometric key guessing attack, replay attack, man-in-the-
middle attack, stolen-verifier attack, forgery attack, and node capture
attack.
+ Efficient in terms of computational and communication overhead com-
pared to the schemes [44] [245] [246].
- Lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67].
Chang et al.
(2016) [76]
- Users, sensor nodes,
and gateway node in
WSN.
- Providing mutual au-
thentication and perfect
forward secrecy.
- Registration phase;
- Authentication phase;
- Password changing
phase.
+ Considers the session key security, perfect forward secrecy, and user
anonymity.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay attack and smart card lost at-
tack.
+ Efficient in terms of computation cost in the authentication phases
compared to the schemes [54] [45] [247] [53].
- Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme
[64].
Jiang et al.
(2016) [77]
- Users, sensor nodes,
and gateway node in
WSN.
- Providing mu-
tual authentication,
anonymity, and un-
traceability.
- Registration phase;
- Login and authentica-
tion phase.
+ Provides mutual authentication, session key agreement, user
anonymity, and user untraceability.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, smart card attack, impersonation at-
tack, modification attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and tracking attack.
+ Efficient in terms of computational cost compared to the schemes [60]
[34] [247] [53] [248].
- Wormhole attack and blackhole attack are not considered.
Farash et
al. (2016)
[78]
- Users, sensor nodes,
and gateway node in
WSN.
- Providing the user au-
thentication with trace-
ability protection and
sensor node anonymity.
- Pre-deployment phase;
- Registration phase;
- Login and authentica-
tion phase;
- Password change
phase.
+ Efficient in terms of communication, computation and storage cost
compared to the scheme [54].
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay attack, privileged-insider attack,
man-in-the-middle attack, insider and stolen verier attack, smart card at-
tack, impersonation attack, bypassing attack, many logged-in users with
the same login-id attack, password change attack, and DoS attack.
- Wormhole attack and blackhole attack are not considered.
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Srinivas et
al. (2017)
[81]
- Users, sensor nodes,
and gateway node in
WSN.
- Providing the mu-
tual authentication with
anonymity and unlinka-
bility.
- System setup phase;
- Sensor node registra-
tion phase;
- User registration
phase;
- System environment
phase;
- Login, authentication,
and key agreement
phase;
- Dynamic node addi-
tion phase;
- Password change
phase.
+ Efficient in terms of communication overhead during the login and
authentication phase compared to the schemes [73] [24] [22] [34] [39] [48]
[44] [249] [54].
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay attack, privileged insider attack,
session key computation attack, gateway node impersonate attack, user
impersonate attack, guessing attack, and sensor node spoofing attack.
- Wormhole attack and blackhole attack are not considered.
- Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme
[64].
Kumari et
al. (2016)
[79]
- Users, sensor nodes,
and gateway node in
WSN.
- Providing the mu-
tual authentication
with traceability and
anonymity.
- Offline sensor node
registration phase;
- User registration
phase;
- Login phase;
- Authentication and
key agreement phase;
- Password update
phase;
- Dynamic sensor node
addition phase.
+ Efficient in terms of end-to-end delay (EED) (in seconds) and through-
put (in bps).
+ Efficient in terms of computation cost in login and authentication
phases compared to both schemes Turkanovic et al. [54] and Farash et
al. [78].
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay attack, stolen smart card attack,
privileged-insider attack, offline password guessing attack, impersonation
attack, and sensor node capture attack.
- Wormhole attack and blackhole attack are not considered.
- Lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67].
Sun et al.
(2016) [156]
- Multicast communi-
cations in WSNs, in-
cluding, sink and many
groups, and each group
have a powerful node
and many low ordinary
nodes.
- Providing the broad-
cast authentication and
enhanced collusion re-
sistance
- Initialization;
- Broadcast;
- Group keys’ recovery
and pairwise keys’ up-
dating;
- Node addition;
- Node revocation.
+ Collusion resistance.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, PKE-attack and PF-attack.
+ Efficient in terms of storage, computation, and communication over-
head compared to the schemes [250] [251] [252] [253].
- The end-to-end delay and throughput are not evaluated compared to
the scheme [79].
- Replay attack is not considered.
Jiang et al.
(2016) [80]
- Users, sensor nodes,
and gateway node in
WSN.
- Achieving mutual au-
thentication among the
communicating agents
with user anonymity
and untraceability.
- Registration phase;
- Login phase;
- Authentication phase;
- Password change
phase.
+ Resistance to attacks, stolen-verifier attack, guessing attack, imperson-
ation attack, modification attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and replay
attack.
+ Efficient in terms of computational cost compared to the schemes in
[34] [247] [53] [248].
- The end-to-end delay and throughput are not evaluated compared to
the scheme [79].
- Collusion resistance is not considered compared to the scheme [156].
5.2. Authentication protocols for IoV
The surveyed papers of authentication protocols for Internet of Vehicles (IoV) as shown in Tab. 21 are published between
2013 and 2016. Cspedes et al. in [42] considered the security association between asymmetric links during Vehicle to Vehicle
(V2V) communications. More precisely, the authors proposed a multi-hop authenticated proxy mobile IP scheme, called
MA-PMIP. Based on authentication phase and mobile router revocation, MA-PMIP can achieve less location update cost
compared with the scheme [240] and the handover delay lower than the scheme [240]. In addition, MA-PMIP can achieve
mutual authentication against authentication attacks but the privacy preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM
scheme [64]. In order to expedite message authentication in VANET, Wasef et al. [43] proposed an expedite message
authentication protocol, named EMAP. Based on the revocation checking process, EMAP can overcome the problem of the
long delay incurred in checking the revocation status of a certificate using a certificate revocation list. EMAP is efficient in
terms of computational complexity of revocation status checking and the authentication delay is constant and independent of
the number of revoked certificates. Therefore, the question we ask here is: can these protocols work well in the decentralized
group model? The authentication scheme proposed recently by Shao et al. in [66] can answer this question where he can
achieve two requirements for threshold authentication, namely, distinguishability and efficient traceability. The protocol in
[66] is proven that is secured by three theorems, namely, 1) The proposed group signature scheme satisfies unforgeability, 2)
The proposed group signature scheme satisfies anonymity, and 3) The proposed theorem satisfies the traceability.
To achieve the non-repudiation in IoV, Lyu et al. in [67] proposed a lightweight authentication scheme called PBA. Based
on the idea of merkle hash tree construction and self-generated MAC storage, the PBA scheme can resist packet losses and
maintain high packet processing rate with low storage overhead. The PBA is efficient in terms of overall delay compared
to the TESLA scheme in [181], [182], and [183] and the VAST scheme in [180]. Zhang et al. in [55] considers a VANET
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with four main entities, i.e., key generator center (KGC), traffic management authority (TMA), RSUs and vehicles. Based
on identity-based aggregate signatures, the protocol in [55] can guarantee some properties such as message authentication,
non-repudiation, message confidentiality, privacy, and traceability. Similar to the scheme [55], Zhang et al. [68] proposed an
efficient distributed aggregate privacy preserving authentication protocol, called DAPPA, which is based on a new security
tool called multiple-TA OTIBAS (MTA-OTIBAS). The DAPPA protocol can guarantee the conditional unlinkability, ideal
tamper-proof device (TPD) freeness, key escrow freeness. In addition, the DAPPA protocol is efficient than the ECDSA
protocol in [184] and more efficient than the IBA scheme in [55] on average, but lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA
scheme in [67]. Based on monolithically certified public key and attributes, Dolev et al. [69] proposed an idea to ensuring
the countermeasures against the Man-in-the-Middle attack under the vehicle authentication. The work in [69] is efficient in
terms of iteration cost compared to other existing Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols such as ISO-KE [241] and
SIGMA [228]. To defend against coordinated cyber-physical attacks, Chan et al. [51] proposed a two-factor cyber-physical
device authentication protocol, which can be applied in the IoV. Especially in the IoT, the vehicles may join or leave the
platoon at any time in the platoon-based vehicular cyber-physical system. To guarantee anonymity of platoon members, Lai
et al. [57] proposed a secure group setup and anonymous authentication scheme, named SGSA, for platoon-based vehicular
cyber-physical systems. Based on the anonymous authentication with traceability phase, the SGSA scheme can provide strong
anonymous access authentication.
5.3. Authentication protocols for IoE
The surveyed papers of authentication protocols for Internet of Energy (IoE) as shown in Tab. 22 are published between
2011 and 2016. We noted here that we have reviewed some authentication protocols proposed for secure smart grid communi-
cations in our survey in [164], namely, the schemes in [254], [255], [256], [33], [257], [258], [259], [260], [261]. In this subsection,
we will review only the works that are not reviewed in the survey [164].
To provide multicast authentication in smart grid, Li et al. [31] proposed the scheme Tunable Signing and Verification
(TSV). Specifically, TSV combines Heavy Signing Light Verification (HSLV) and Light Signing Heavy Verification (LSHV) to
achieve a flexible tradeoff between the two. TSV can reduce the storage cost, but the privacy-preserving is not discussed and
the reports’ confidentiality and integrity are not considered compared to the scheme [52]. The smart meters is planning to
reduce the time intervals to 1 min or even less. For this, Li et al. [52] developed a merkle-tree-based authentication scheme
to minimize computation overhead on the smart meters. The work [52] is efficient in terms of computation complexity of
the HAN user and the neighborhood gateway compared to the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA)-based authentication scheme
[262]. Therefore, Li et al. [150] fixed the single-point failure in smart grid by proposing the idea of deploys a fault tolerance
architecture to execute the authentication approach without any additional configuration or setup. Based on both main
processes, namely, 1) Batch verification and trinary diagnose TreeBatch, and 2) Signature amortization for Package Blocks,
the work [150] can legalize the data aggregation with tremendously less signing and verification operations.
Nicanfar et al. [151] addressed the key management for unicast and multicast communications in the smart grid. The work
[173] proposed a scheme for the mutual authentication between the smart grid utility network and Home Area Network smart
meters, called SGAS-I, which he can increases performance of the key management and does not cause any security drawback.
Based on the multicast key support phase, SGAS-I can provide simplicity and low overhead, but the reports’ confidentiality
and integrity are considered compared to the scheme [52]. To guarantee the message authentication with identity privacy
and traceability, Chim et al. [152] proposed a scheme, called PASS, for the hierarchical structure of a smart grid. The PASS
scheme focus only on the substation-to-consumer subsystem where the real identity of any smart appliance can only be known
by the control center using the concept of pseudo identity. Similar to the PASS scheme, Fouda et al. [153] proposed a scheme
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that can only providing an authenticated and encrypted channel for the late successive transmission but can also establish a
semantic-secure shared key in the mutual authentication environment. The work in [153] is efficient in terms of communication
overhead and message decryption/verification delay compared to ECDSA-256, but the identity privacy and traceability are
not considered compared to the scheme [152].
In order to provide the mutual authentication between smart meters and the security and authentication server in the
smart grid using passwords, Nicanfar et al. [154] proposed a mutual authentication scheme and a key management protocol,
called SGMA and SGKM, respectively. The SGMA scheme concentrates on data communications over the advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI) outside of the HAN domain, which each node has a unique ID and each smart meter has a unique
serial number SN embedded by the manufacturer and an initial secret password. On the other hand, the SGKM protocol
concentrates on node-to-node secure communications, which the nodes have the appropriate private–public keys to be used
for unicast. Based on the multicast key mechanism, the SGMA scheme can prevent various attacks while reducing the
management overhead, but lack non-repudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [67]. Shim et al. [58] consider a smart grid
network based on hierarchical architecture, i.e., HANs, BANs, NANs. The work [58] proposed privacy-preserving recording
and gateway-assisted authentication of power usage information. The message filtering at gateway smart meters can helpful
in reducing the impact of attacking traffic. Similar to the scheme [58], Mahmood et al. [70] proposed a lightweight message
authentication scheme. Based on two main processes, namely, 1) Authentication and 2) Message transmission, the scheme
[70] can detect and omit some attacks, namely, replay, false message injection, message analysis and modification attacks. In
addition, the scheme [70] is efficient in terms of communication cost and computation cost compared to the schemes [33] and
[38], but the location privacy is not considered.
5.4. Authentication protocols for IoS
The surveyed papers of authentication protocols for Internet of Sensors (IoS) as shown in Tab. 23 are published in 2016.
We noted here that we have reviewed some authentication protocols proposed for ad hoc social network (an application of
WSN) in our survey in [165], namely, the protocols in [263], [264], [265], [266], [267], and [268]. In this subsection, we will
review only the works that are not reviewed in the survey [165] and the articles published in 2016 related to authentication
protocols for IoS. For more details about the articles published before 2016, we refer the reader to six surveys published in
2013, 2014, and 2015, namely, [269], [270], [271], [272], [273], [274].
Kumari et al. [71] reviewed and examined both schemes proposed by Li et al.’s in [45] and He et al.’s in [60] for its suitability
to WSNs. Based on the results of this analysis, the authors proposed a chaotic maps based user friendly authentication scheme
for WSN with forward secrecy and wrong identifier detection mechanism at the time of login. The idea is to establish a session
key between user and sensor node (SN) using extended chaotic maps. The scheme of Kumari et al. [71] is efficient in
unauthorized login detection with wrong identity and password, but the data integrity is not considered. Similar to the [71],
Chung et al. [72] reviewed and examined the scheme [63]. Based the security weaknesses of the scheme [63], the work [72]
proposed an enhanced lightweight anonymous authentication scheme for a scalable localization roaming service in WSN. Using
three phases, namely, 1) Registration phase, 2) Login and authentication phase, and 3) Password change phase, the work [72]
can provide both anonymity, hop-by-hop authentication, and untraceability, but location privacy is not considered.
Jan et al. [155] proposed an extremely lightweight payload-based mutual authentication, called PAWN, for the cluster-
based hierarchical WSN. The PAWN scheme is based on two main phases, namely, 1) Token-based cluster head election and 2)
Payload-based mutual authentication. With the phase 1, the higher-energy nodes perform various administrative tasks such
as route discovery, route maintenance, and neighborhood discovery. The authentication procedure is accomplished using the
cooperative neighbor × neighbor (CNN) [275], i.e., session initiation, server challenge, client response and challenge, server
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response. The PAWN scheme is efficient in terms of average energy consumption and Handshake duration compared to the
LEACH-C scheme in [242] and the SecLEACH scheme [243], but the privacy-preservation is not analyzed compared against
other methods, such as the GLARM scheme [64]. Based on the security weaknesses of the scheme [54], Amin et al. [73]
proposed a secure lightweight scheme for user authentication and key agreement in multi-gateway based WSN. The scheme
[73] is efficient in terms of computational cost, storage and communication cost compared to the schemes [54], [44] [39], [48],
and [34]. In addition, the scheme [73] can provide very less energy consumption of the sensor nodes and user anonymity.
For the security of real-time data access in WSNs, Gope et al. [74] proposed an authentication protocol to ensuring
the user anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and resiliency of stolen smart card attacks. The protocol [74] is efficient in
terms of computational and communication cost compared to the schemes [34], [44], [244], [214] and [75]. Based on the
security weaknesses of the scheme [214], Das [75] proposed a secure and robust temporal credential-based three-factor user
authentication scheme. The scheme [75] use a biometric, password and smart card of a legal user. The simulation results
of the scheme [75] demonstrate that it is efficient in terms of computational and communication overhead compared to the
schemes [44], [245], and [246]. Based on the weaknesses in Turkanovic et al.’s protocol [54], Chang et al. [76] proposed a
flexible authentication protocol using the smart card for WSNs, which operates in two modes, namely, 1) provides a lightweight
authentication scheme, and 2) an advanced protocol based on ECC, which provides perfect forward secrecy. Both this two
modes are efficient in terms of computation cost in the authentication phases compared to the schemes [54], [45], [247], and
[53].
Trying to deal with the weaknesses of the scheme presented in [60], Jiang et al. [77] proposed an untraceable two-factor
authentication scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography. The scheme [77] is efficient in terms of computational cost
compared to previous schemes [60], [34], [247], [53] , and [248], but the performance of the system under common attacks
such as the wormhole attack and the blackhole attack is not presented. Based on the weaknesses in the scheme [54], Farash
et al. [78] proposed an efficient user authentication and key agreement scheme for heterogeneous wireless sensor network
tailored for the Internet of Things environment. The scheme [78] is efficient in terms of communication, computation and
storage cost compared to the scheme [54], but again the performance of the system under the wormhole attack or the blackhole
attack is not presented. Based on the weaknesses in the Amin and Biswas’s scheme [73], Srinivas et al. [81] proposed a user
authentication scheme for multi-gateway WSNs. The scheme [81] is efficient in terms of communication overhead during the
login and authentication phase compared to the schemes [73], [24], [22] [34], [39], [48], [44], [249], [54], but the performance of
the system in terms of privacy-preservation is not analyzed compared to previous methods, such as the GLARM scheme [64].
Similar to both schemes [77] and [81], Kumari et al. [79] pointed out that the scheme of Farash et al. [78] is insecure against
some attacks. Especially, the work presented in [79] is efficient not only in terms of end-to-end delay (EED) (in seconds)
and throughput (in bps), but also in terms of computation cost in either login and authentication phases compared to both
schemes Turkanovic et al. [54] and Farash et al. [78].
Sun et al. [156] considered the multicast communications in WSNs, including, sink and many groups, where each group
may have a powerful node and many low ordinary nodes. The powerful node acts as the group manager (GM), and is
responsible for network security management, such as key issues, updating, revocation, intrusion detection, etc. Then, the
authors reviewed and examined the scheme [212] in order to propose a scheme that considers the forward security, backward
security, and collusion resistance. Based on the idea of access polynomial, the Sun et al. scheme [156] is efficient in terms
of storage, computation, and communication overhead compared to the schemes [250], [251], [252] , and [253], but not only
the end-to-end delay and throughput are not evaluated compared to the scheme [79], also the replay attack is not considered.
Jiang et al. proposed a scheme [80] that can achieve mutual authentication among the communicating agents with user
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anonymity and untraceability. In addition, the Jiang et al. scheme [80] is efficient in terms of computational cost compared
to the schemes in [34], [247], [53], [248], but the collusion resistance is not considered compared to the scheme in [156].
Based on the weaknesses in the scheme [276], Wu et al. [157] proposed an improved three-factor authentication scheme
for WSNs, which can be resistant to the de-synchronization attack. Das et al. [158] reviewed the recently proposed Chang–
Le’s two protocols [277] and then showed that their protocols are insecure against some known attacks. Liu and Chung [159]
proposed a secure user authentication scheme for wireless healthcare sensor networks, which is efficient in terms of computation
cost of compared to both schemes in [278] and [279]. Gope et al. [280] proposed a special idea for resilience of DoS attacks in
designing anonymous user authentication protocol. Combining three techniques, namely, smart card, password, and personal
biometrics, Das et al. [223] proposed a three-factor user authentication and key agreement scheme based on multi-gateway
WSN architecture. The scheme [223] is efficient in terms of computational, communication, and energy costs compared to
the schemes [73], [48], [44], [54]. Benzaid et al. [281] proposed an accelerated verification of digital signatures generated by
BNN-IBS [282], which is an idea inspired by the acceleration technique of Fan and Gong [283].
6. Open Issues
6.1. M2M Open Issues
M2M communications can facilitate many applications, like e-health, smart grids, industrial automation and enviromental
monitoring but on the same time face various security threats and trust issues. Especially in e-health authentication of the
devices must be robust to attacks that could threaten the correct exhancge of information and the consequently the life
of the patient. In order to safely share and manage access to information in the healthcare system, it is essential to be
able to authenticate users, including organizations and people. In Australia authentication is achieved through the use of
digital certificates that conform to the Australian Government endorsed Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) standard, through
the National Authentication Service for Health (NASH) but thorough research of the resistance to attacks of this and other
similar systems is needed in order to reassure its robustness. Scalability and Heterogeneity is a rather general problem when
dealing with M2M communication of devices that come from different vendors and using different operating systems. Solutions
that focus only to Android devices [149] cannot guarantee end to end security of the system.
6.2. IoV Open Issues
Although a number of authentication protocols have been proposed recently which are capable of guaranteeing authenti-
cation for a network of vehicles, there are still open issues that need to be addressed by the research community.
6.2.1. Autonomous driving
Until now anonymity of platoon members has been addressed in [57], which is capable of providing strong anonymous
access authentication to the members of the platoon. Taking on step further and dealing with full automated vehicles that
will be able to create platoons on the fly, with no central entity or trust authority in reach, novel authentication methods that
vehicles can run by themselves must be developed. This could be done using several techniques. One method would be to
use digital signatures, where each vehicle holds its own signing key and can verify its identity by signing challenges, combined
with a defense mechanism that can face MITM attacks. Other method could be the use of the trust levels of every vehicle
using methods similar to [284].
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6.2.2. Heterogeneous vehicular networking
The design, development and deployment of vehicular networks is boosted by recent advances in wireless vehicular commu-
nication techniques, such as dedicated short-range communications (DSRC), Long-Term Evolution (LTE), IEEE 802.11p and
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMax). Novel protocols that can be deployed on all these communication
channels and can guarantee authentication under attacks that can be initiated from each one of these networks is an area of
future research. Safeguarding one communication channel without dealing with the threats that all these networks face, will
leave the IoV vulnerable to several kinds of attacks against authentication.
6.2.3. Social Internet of Vehicles
Social Internet of Vehicles (SIoV) describes both the social interactions among vehicles [285] and among drivers [286].
Ensuring authentication in the communication among vehicles cannot guarantee full protection of identities of entities if the
social notion of communication is neglected [134]. Future authentiation-enhancing technologies for SIoVs should be based on
proven authentication-enhancing technologies for social networks and vehicular networks.
6.3. IoE Open Issues
Based on the definition of the Internet of Energy as an integrated dynamic network infrastructure based on standard and
interoperable communication protocols that interconnect the energy network with the Internet allowing units of energy to be
dispatched when and where it is needed, it is easily understood that authentication in the IoE environment is not an easy
problem to solve. IoE combines M2M, V2G, IIoT (industrial Internet of things), Smart home automation, cloud services
and IoS. It would be better to define IoE as an application of the IoT on the Energy domain. Authentication on the IoE
domain cannot be reassured without dealing with each of the aforementioned sub domains. Security [287] and hardware [288]
authentication techniques along with solutions dealing with middleware security [289] must be combined.
6.4. IoS Open Issues
The major problems that the IoS networks have to face are energy efficiency and security assurance of the sensors.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and energy efficient mechanisms are not thoroughly investigated and resolved in the
surveyed authentication protocols for the IoS. Raza et al. [290] proposed an idea based on real-time intrusion detection for the
IoT, called SVELTE. Mechanisms that can extend the SVELTE scheme for the IoS in order to be energy effiecient would be
a possible research direction. Hence, future works addressing both security, mainly IDSs, and energy will have an important
contribution for the authentication protocols. In addition, we believe further research is needed to develop a new framework
for combining intrusion detection systems and authentication protocols for detecting and avoiding attacks in IoS.
6.5. Pattern recognition and biometrics for the IoT
Hybrid authentication protocols are based on two methods for identifying an individual, including, knowledge-based (e.g.,
the passwords) and token-based (e.g., the badges). Each method has its weakness, i.e., 1) the password can be forgotten or
guessed by an adversary, and 2) the badge can be lost or stolen. Nevertheless, the safest way is the use of biometric charac-
teristics because two people cannot possess exactly the same biometric characteristic. Hence, future works addressing pattern
recognition authentication techniques along with biometrics will have an important contribution in improving authentication
in the IoT. Recently new promising efforts that apply biometrics on IoT have been proposed [291, 292, 293] and the term
of Internet of biometric things (IoBT) has been introduced[294]. Biometric technology on the other hand rises privacy and
ethical issues that need to be taken in mind when designing new authentication protocols, especially for applications that deal
with critical data [295]
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7. Conclusion
This paper contains a structured comprehensive overview of authentication protocols for the IoT in four environments,
including, (1) Machine to machine communications (M2M), (2) Internet of Vehicles (IoV), (3) Internet of Energy (IoE), and
(4) Internet of Sensors (IoS). We presented the survey articles published in the recent years for the IoT. We reviewed the
major threats, countermeasures, and formal security verification techniques used by authentication protocols. We presented a
side-by-side comparison in a tabular form for the current state-of-the-art of authentication protocols proposed for M2M, IoV,
IoE, and IoS.
After conducting a comprehensive survey of authentication protocols, we see that the reliability of an authentication
protocol depends not only on the effectiveness of the cryptography method used against attacks but also on the computation
complexity and communication overhead. Therefore, in order to guarantee authentication between the machines for the IoT,
we invite well-positioned researchers and practitioners to propose authentication frameworks that covers not only one but
three layers, namely, the application layer, the network layer, and the sensing layer. In this paper, we also see a need for a
comprehensive survey for privacy-preserving schemes for the IoT under four environments, including, M2M, IoV, IoE, and
IoS.
Authentication protocols for the IoT may be improved in terms of (1) addressing both the authentication and privacy
problem, (2) developing efficient IDSs, (3) improving the computation complexity of the proposed methods, (4) improving
the communication overhead of the methods, (5) developing of formal security verification techniques, (6) accounting of the
process of detecting and avoiding attacks, and (7) capturing of experts opinion in the field of computer security.
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